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CHARTER DIALOGUE REVISITED-
OR "MUCH ADO ABOUT
METAPHORS''©
PETER W. HOGG,* ALLISON A. BUSHELL THORNTON** & WADE K.
WRIGHT -
This article is a sequel to the 1997 article "The Charter
Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures (Or
Perhaps The Charter of Rights Isn't Such A Bad Thing
After All)." In the present article, the authors review
various academic critiques of their "dialogue" theory,
which postulates that Charter decisions striking down
laws are not the last word, but rather the beginning of
a "dialogue," because legislative bodies are generally
able to (and generally do) enact sequel legislation that
accomplishes the main objective of the
unconstitutional law. The authors also examine the
Supreme Court of Canada's dicta on the "dialogue"
phenomenon, and update the data on which their 1997
article was based. They conclude that the dialogue
phenomenon is alive and well and that the critique of
the original article is largely "much ado about
metaphors."
Cet article repr6sente la suite l'article datant de 1997,
intitul6 . Le dialogue sur la Charte entre les tribunaux
et les l6gislatures (et si la Charte des droits n'6tait
finalement pas si mauvaise) -. Dans cet article, les
auteurs se penchent sur diverses critiques de leur
th6orie du " dialogue -, laquelle postule que les
d6cisions au titre de la Charte des droits et libert6s,
lorsqu'elles abrogent certaines lois, ne constituent pas
des.d6cisions p6remptoires, mais plut6t le d6but d'un
, dialogue -, car les corps 16gislatifs sont en g6n6ral
capables (et le font d'ailleurs g6n6ralement) de
d6cr6ter une 16gislation ult6rieure atteignant le
principal objectif de la loi anticonstitutionnelle. Par
ailleurs, les auteurs examinent les opinions de Ia Cour
Supr6me concernant le ph6nom~ne du . dialogue ., et
actualisent les informations sur lesquelles reposait leur
article de 1997. Pour conclure, ils affirment que le
ph6nom~ne du dialogue est bel et bien vivant, et que la
critique du premier article constitue amplement
- beaucoup de bruit pour des metaphores -.
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I. PURPOSE OF ARTICLE
In 1997, we published an article in the Osgoode Hall Law
Journal entitled "The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and
Legislatures (Or Perhaps The Charter of Rights Isn't Such a Bad Thing
After All)."' The purpose of the article was to challenge the anti-
majoritarian objection, to the legitimacy of judicial review under the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.' The objection is that it is
undemocratic for judges, who are neither elected to their offices nor
accountable for their actions, to be vested with the power to strike down
laws that have been enacted by the duly elected representatives of the
Peter W. Hogg & Allison A. Bushell, "The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and
Legislatures (Or Perhaps The Charter of Rights Isn't Such A Bad Thing After All)" (1997) 35
Osgoode Hall L.J. 75 [" Charter Dialogue"].
2 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982 being Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [Charter.
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people. This is the reason why majoritarian critics say that the Charter is
a "bad thing."
In the 1997 article, "Charter Dialogue," we reviewed 'the
structural features of the Charter that enabled legislatures to limit,
modify, or override the Charter guarantees. The most important
features we noted were the reasonable limits justification of section 1
and the similar justifications built into the qualified rights in sections 7,
8, 9, and 12. We also pointed out that the guarantee of equality in
section 15 could normally (but admittedly not always) be complied with
in a variety of ways. And, of course, we discussed section- 33, the
override clause, which allows most holdings of invalidity to be
overridden simply by the inclusion of a notwithstanding clause in the
new law. These features of the Charter ensured that after a law was
found to be invalid by the courts, legislatures would normally be left
with a range of choices as to the design of corrective legislation-
legislation that would accomplish the same objective, or nearly the same
objective, as the law that was struck down by the courts. Our hypothesis
was that, while the Charter would often influence the design of
legislation that encroached on a guaranteed right, it would "rarely
[raise] an absolute barrier to the wishes of the democratic institutions."3
Legislatures would retain the primary responsibility for social and
economic policy, and. would usually be able to accomplish what they
wanted to do while respecting the requirements of the Charter.
To test our hypothesis, we examined the aftermath of every
court case in which a law had been declared contrary to the Charter by
the Supreme Court of Canada (as well as most of those few lower court
decisions that had not been appealed to the Supreme Court). The
results were surprising. There were 66 cases in which a law was held to
be invalid for breach of the Charter. Of those 66 cases, all but 13 had
elicited some response from the competent legislative body. In seven
cases, the response was simply to repeal the offending law. In the
remaining 46 cases-more than two-thirds of the total-a new law was
substituted for the old one. In two cases, the decisions were effectively
overruled because the new law essentially re-enacted the law that had
been held to be invalid-once through the use of section 334 and once
Supra note 1 at 81.
Ford v. Quebec, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712 (striking down French-only requirement for
commercial signs in Quebec) was followed by An Act to Amend the Charter of the French
2007]
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through the use of section .5 In the other cases, however, the legislature
respected the judicial decision by adding some civil libertarian
safeguards in the new version of the law, but maintained the legislative
purpose. A schedule to the 1997 article details the specific legislative
action in each case.6 The numbers made clear, to an extent far greater
than we expected, that judicial review was not "the last word" on
legislation that had been successfully challenged on Charter grounds. In
most instances, the judicial decision did not preclude legislation that
continued to pursue the objectives of the original law. We concluded
that, while the Charter had given judges considerable authority to curtail
legislative actions that impinged on protected rights and freedoms, it
had by no means ousted majoritarian will.
In 1997, the literature on judicial review was predominantly
American, and the Canadian contributions naturally drew inspiration
from the American literature. Most Canadian writers assumed a "strong
form" of judicial review, under which courts usually have the last word.
Our study made clear that in Canada we had a weaker form of judicial
review that rarely had the effect of actually defeating the purpose of the
legislative body. We perhaps went too far in suggesting that our study
was "an answer" to the anti-majoritarian objection to judicial review,7
but the findings certainly made the anti-majoritarian objection difficult
to sustain.
In "Charter Dialogue," we referred to the sequence of new laws
following Charter decisions as a "Charter dialogue" between the courts
and legislatures. By this, we did not mean that the courts and
legislatures were literally "talking" to each other. We made it clear that
all that we meant by the dialogue metaphor was that the court decisions
in Charter cases usually left room for a legislative response, and usually
received a legislative response.8 In other words, the Charter's influence
Language, S.Q. 1988, c. 54 (essentially re-enacting the pre-existing law, using a notwithstanding
clause under section 33).
' R. v. Daviault, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 63 (striking down the common law rule denying self-
induced intoxication as defence to crimes of general intent) was followed by An Act to amend the
Ciminal Code, S.C. 1995, c. 32 (essentially re-enacting the common law rule, not using a
notwithstanding clause).
6 Supra note 1 at 107-24.
7 Ibid. at 105.
8 Ibid. at 82.
[VOL. 45, NO. I
2007] Charter Dialogue Revisited 5
was much less direct than the simple rule by judicial decree that was
assumed by the critics of judicial review. Metaphorically speaking, there
were at least two "voices" translating Charter requirements into laws,
but the most important of those voices was the competent legislature.
We could not possibly have anticipated back in 1997 that the
article, and in particular our use of the dialogue metaphor, would
become the subject of so much discussion, debate, and deconstruction
by judges, law professors, and political scientists. By 2006, a total of 27
reported decisions (ten Supreme Court of Canada decisions, 9 five
provincial appellate decisions, 10 seven decisions by the superior courts of
the provinces or territories, 1 one decision of the Federal Court of
Appeal, 12 and one of a provincial court 3) had referred to the concept of
Charter dialogue. Charter dialogue has been the subject of speeches by
members of Parliament and members of the judiciary, 4 and has been a
topic for academic discussion in numerous courses in law and political
science. Scholarly critique has ranged from articles that suggest that
9 Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493 at 566-67, 578 [ Vrien]; R. v. Mills, [1999] 3 S.C.R.
668 at 689, 745 [Mills]; M v H., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3 at 181 [M v. H.]; Corbiere v. Canada (Minister of
Indian and Northern Affairs), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 203 at 283 [Corbiere]; Little Sisters Book & Art
Emporium v. Canada, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1120 at 1257-58 [Little Sisters]; R. v. Hall, [2002] 3 S.C.R.
309 at 333-34, 369-70 [Hall; Sauv6 v. Canada, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519 at 538, 576-77 [Sauve; Bell
ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559 at 598-99 [Bell Express Vu]; Doucet-
Boudreau v. Nova Scotia, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 3 at 36-37; and Harper v. Canada, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 827 at
848-49 [Harpe].
10 Reilly v. Alberta (Provincial Court, Chief Judge), 2000 ABCA 241, 266 A.R. 296 at 310
(C.A.); Harper v. Canada, [2002] 320 A.R. 1 at 34, 52-53 (C.A.); Halpern v. Canada (Attorney
General) (2002), 60 O.R. (3d) 321 at 330 (Div. Ct.); Criminal Lawyers'Assn. v. Ontario (Ministry
of Public Safety and Security) (2004), 70 O.R. (3d) 332 at 368-69 (Div. Ct.); and Christie v. British
Columbia, 2005 BCCA 631, 262 D.L.R. (4th) 51 at 73-74, 83.
11 United States ofAmerica v. Tilley, [1996] A.J. No. 718 at para. 14 (Q.B.) (QL); Driskell
v. Manitoba (Attorney General), [1999] 11 W.W.R. 615 at 629; R. v. Brenton, (1999) 180 D.L.R.
(4th) 314 at 323-24; R. v. Manios (1999), 67 C.R.R. (2d) 138 at 142; Mathew v. Canada, [2003] 1
C.T.C. 2045 at 2168; J TL Macdonald Corp. v. Canada (Attorney General), [2003] R.J.Q, 181 at
189, 209; and Procureurg6neral du Ou6bec c. Confdrence desjuges du Qu6bec [2003] R.J.Q. 2057
at 2062.
12Sauv6 v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), [2000] 2 F.C. 117 at 148 (C.A.).
13R. v. Masse, [2003] B.C.J. No. 2085 at para. 51 (Prov. Ct.) (QL).
' See e.g. David Kilgour, "Whither Judicial Restraint" (Remarks to the Edmonton Legal
Forum, 18 September 2003), online: <http://www.david-kilgour.com/mp/judicial/htm>; Beverley
McLachlin, "The Supreme Court and the Public Interest" (2001) 64 Sask. L. Rev. 309; and Claire
L'Heureux-Dub6, "The Dissenting Opinion: Voice of the Future?" (2000) 38 Osgoode Hall L.J.
495.
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dialogue has the potential to undermine judicial review15 to articles that
accuse it of lending a false legitimacy to the influence of an
undemocratic "court party" over courts and legislatures.16 The use of
legislative sequels as a proxy for dialogue has been criticized by some as
overstating the relationship between courts and legislatures, by some as
understating the relationship, and by others as simultaneously doing
both.17 In short, a law journal article on "Charter dialogue" has
precipitated its own vigorous, multi-faceted dialogue.
To date, our own participation in the "dialogue about dialogue"
has been limited to short replies to the critiques of a few authors.18
However, the din of collective voices analyzing, attacking, defending,
discussing, adapting, and applying the dialogue metaphor has finally
grown too lively for us to resist. This article attempts a more
comprehensive review of the growth since 1997 of the phenomenon we
describe as dialogue and a more considered analysis of the views of our
critics. With the Charteis greater maturity, and, in particular, with some
of the laws that were modified in response to early Charter decisions
now coming back to the Court for a "second look," the nature of the
dialogue between the courts and legislatures has become more complex.
For example, the Court has been called upon to consider several
challenges to election laws under section 3 of the Charter, a section for
which the section 33 legislative override power is unavailable; these
decisions therefore provide a more restrictive scope for legislative
response and a greater challenge for the notion of dialogue. 19 In
'
5 Jamie Cameron, "Dialogue and Hierarchy in Charter Interpretation: A Comment on R.
v. Millg' (2001) 38 Alta. L. Rev. 1051 [Cameron, "Dialogue and Hierarchy"].
16 F.L. Morton & Rainer Knopff, The Charter Revolution and the Court Party
(Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press, 2000).
17 See e.g. Christopher P. Manfredi & James B. Kelly, "Six Degrees of Dialogue: A
Response to Hogg and Bushell" (1999) 37 Osgoode Hall L.J. 513 [Manfredi & Kelly, "Six Degrees
of Dialogue"]; Christopher P. Manfredi & James B. Kelly, "Dialogue, Deference and Restraint:
Judicial Independence and Trial Procedures" (2001) 64 Sask. L. Rev. 323 [Manfredi & Kelly,
"Dialogue, Deference and Restraint"]; and F.L. Morton, "Dialogue or Monologue?" Policy
Options(April 1999) 23.
18 Peter W. Hogg & Allison A. Thornton, "Reply to 'Six Degrees of Dialogue' (1999) 37
Osgoode Hall L.J. 529 [Hogg & Thornton, "Reply to 'Six Degrees of Dialogue"']; Peter W. Hogg &
Allison A. Thornton, "The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures" (April 1999) Policy
Options 19; and Peter W. Hogg, "The Charter Revolution: Is it Undemocratic?" (2001) 12 Const.
Forum Const. 1 [Hogg, "The CharterRevolution"].
"See e.g. Sauv4 supra note 9.
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addition, the Court has been called upon in many more cases to design
Charter remedies, and, in particular, to determine whether it is
appropriate to suspend a declaration of invalidity in order to give the
legislature an opportunity to respond by enacting a corrective law.
In this article, we revisit the original hypothesis of "Charter
Dialogue" in light of the developments in the Supreme Court of
Canada's Charter jurisprudence and in the academic commentary since
1997. The article is organized into three parts. In Part II, we discuss, and
comment upon, the use that the Court has made of ideas of dialogue. In
Part III, we discuss, and respond to, the main academic criticisms of the
notion of dialogue. And, in Part IV, we provide an update of "the
numbers" since "Charter Dialogue" was published in 1997.
In the end, we return to our original conclusion that the notion
of dialogue poses a serious challenge (although perhaps not a complete
answer) to the anti-majoritarian objection to judicial review. We should
make clear at the outset that we are not especially interested in debating
the critics on the question of whether the word "dialogue" is an apt
description of the dynamics between the legislative and judicial branches
in respect of Charter decisions. We accept, of course, that people may
reasonably disagree about whether "dialogue" is the proper word to use
(although no alternative has been suggested). However, we are
principally interested in considering and responding to criticisms of the
substantive thesis of our article-that Charter decisions usually leave
room for, and usually receive, a legislative response. This is why we have
subtitled the article "Much Ado About Metaphors."
II. DIALOGUE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
"Charter Dialogue" focused on the legislative sequels to judicial
decisions. We did not anticipate that our observations of the dialogue
phenomenon would be of any interest to judges, who are well and truly
out of the picture by the time a legislature enacts legislation in response
to one of their decisions. It came, therefore, as a considerable surprise
that our article captured so much judicial attention, and to find that the
Supreme Court of Canada and other courts have made frequent
reference to the article. In this section, we attempt to categorize the use
that the Court has made of ideas of dialogue. It has come up in a variety
of contexts: in judicial reflections about the legitimacy of judicial review;
in considering whether to "read down" an unconstitutional statute; in
designing other remedies for unconstitutional statutes; and in
2007]
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determining the appropriate level of scrutiny for a "second look"
statute. Each of these references to dialogue will now be considered.
A. Justifying Judicial Review
The anti-majoritarian objection to judicial review and the debate
it sparks is primarily an academic one. The constitution of Canada
assigns judges their adjudicative role, and if that role is "undemocratic,"
there is little judges can do about it. Further, to the extent that the
judicial role or particular decisions attract criticism (as they often do,
particularly after a controversial decision), the conventional limits on
judicial speech preclude judges from responding publicly. Nevertheless,
it would be unrealistic to suppose that the sometimes harsh criticism of
unpopular decisions does not reach the eyes and ears of judges. The
judges of the Supreme Court of Canada, who now like to write in a
discursive style, have occasionally taken the opportunity to weigh in on
the anti-majoritarian objection to judicial review in their judgments.
This is one context in which the Court has shown interest in the idea of
dialogue.
The first time that the Court referred to our article, and the first
time that the Court invoked the idea of "dialogue," was in Vriend v.
Alberta (1998).20 The issue in the case was whether Alberta's human
rights code 21 violated the equality guarantee in section 15 of the Charter
by not protecting against discrimination on the ground of sexual
orientation. The Alberta code included all the grounds customarily
found in Canadian human rights codes, with the exception of sexual
orientation. The Court decided unanimously that the omission of sexual
orientation from the legislation was a breach of the equality guarantee.
The Court went on to decide, with only a single dissenting voice (Justice
Major from Alberta), that the remedy for the breach was for the Court
to invoke its newly assumed power of "reading in" and to add sexual
orientation directly to the statutory list. This was the very thing that
Alberta's legislative assembly had debated and rejected. Obviously, this
decision was going to be controversial! Justice lacobucci, writing for the
majority on the issue of remedy, attempted to articulate a democratic
rationale for judicial review. He made the general point that "the
20 Vriend, supra note 9.
21 Individual's Rights Protection Act, R.S.A. 1980, c. 1-2, as am. S.A. 1990, c. 23.
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concept of democracy means more than majority rule," especially where
the interests of minorities are affected.2 But he also focused on our
dialogue article, pointing out that "the work of the legislature is
reviewed by the courts and the work of the court in its decisions can be
reacted to by the legislature in the passing of new legislation. 23 In
Justice lacobucci's assessment, this helped to justify the strong remedy
imposed by the Court in this case. He pointed out that the remedy of
reading in need not be "the end of the legislative process," because the
competent legislature "can pass new legislation in response," and any
new legislation could invoke the override provision of section 33 of the
Charter, which he described as "the ultimate parliamentary
safeguard., 24 The decision was in fact followed by a vigorous public
debate in Alberta about the use of section 33, and in the end the
government of Alberta decided not to use section 33 and not to remove
the language that the Court had added to the statute.
Another decision respecting same-sex relationships was M v. H.
(1999),26 where the Court, by a majority of eight to one, held that
Ontario's Family Law Act27 was in breach of the equality guarantee of
the Charter because it excluded same-sex couples from the mutual
support obligations that the Act imposed on opposite-sex couples in
common-law relationships. In this case, the Court did not directly
amend the legislation, but suspended the declaration of invalidity for six
months to enable the legislature to comply with the decision. This was
another controversial decision, and Justice Bastarache, who wrote a
concurring opinion, was moved to articulate a defence of judicial review
22 Vriend, supra note 9 at 577.
Ibid. at 566. The discussion of dialogue is at 562-66, 578.
24 Ibid. at 578.
I Premier Klein explained that "[i]t became abundantly clear that to individuals in this
country the Charter of Rights and Freedoms is paramount and the use of any tool ... to undermine
[it] is something that should be used only in very, very rare circumstances." See Christopher P.
Manfredi, Judicial Power and the Charter: Canada and the Paradox of Liberal Constitutionalism,
2d ed. (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2001) at 187-88 [Manfredi, JudicialPoweli.
By coincidence, one of the authors, Peter Hogg, was in Calgary for several days before
and after the release of the Court's decision. He observed the media and general public discussion
of the issue, which started as soon as the date of the release of the decision was announced and
continued for several days after the release of the decision, until the premier announced that the
government had decided not to propose any action by the legislature.
2 6 M. v, H., supra note 9.
2 7 R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3.
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that relied in part on our article. Quoting the article, he said that judicial
review was not "a veto over the politics of the nation," but was rather
"the beginning of a dialogue" between courts and legislatures.28 The
government of Ontario was clearly unhappy with the decision, but made
no attempt to escape from it: its legislature reluctantly enacted a law
extending mutual support obligations to same-sex couples-but notably
without describing them as "spouses. ,29
B. Opposing Reading Down
"Reading down" is the technique of statutory interpretation by
which a court will prefer the interpretation of a statute that does not
offend the constitution over an interpretation that would offend the
constitution. Reading down is not to be confused with "reading in," by
which a court will explicitly add new words to a statute which has been
declared unconstitutional, as written, in order to bring the statute into
compliance with the constitution (as occurred in Vriend, discussed in
Part IIA).30 Reading down is simply a canon of interpretation. It has
often been employed in division of powers cases, in which context it has
M v. H., supra note 9 at 181.
29 Amendments Because of the Supreme Court of Canada Decision in M v. H. Act, 1999,
S.O. 1999, c. 6. This extraordinary title is the basis for the adverb "reluctantly" in the text. The
current Liberal government of Ontario recently repealed the separate category of "same-sex
partner" put in place by this legislation and enacted omnibus legislation that simply included same-
sex couples in the definition of "spouse." See Spousal Relationship Statute Law Amendment Ac4
2005, S.O. 2005, c. 5.
The Supreme Court's decision in M v. H. was followed by a series of court challenges to
the opposite-sex definition of marriage. These decisions found, with one exception that was later
overruled, that the opposite-sex definition of marriage violated section 15(1) of the Charter and
was not saved by section 1. The key decisions are from British Columbia (EGALE Canada Inc. v.
Canada (Attorney General) (2003), 225 D.L.R. (4th) 472 (B.C.C.A.), rev'g (2001) 95 B.C.L.R. (3d)
122 (S.C.)); Ontario (Halpern v. Canada (Attorney General) (2003), 65 O.R. (3d) 161 (C.A.), rev'g
in part Halpern v. Canada (Attorney General) (2002), 215 D.L.R. (4th) 223 (Div. Ct.)); and
Quebec (Hendricks c. Ou6bec (Procureur G6n6ral, [2002] R.J.Q. 2506 (C.S.)). The Government
of Canada abandoned its defence of the opposite-sex definition of marriage in July 2003, and
responded to these court decisions, after a reference to the Supreme Court of Canada (Re Same-
Sex Marriage, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698), by securirP the enactment of the Civil Marriage Act, S.C. 2005,
c. 33, which authorized same-sex marriages across the country.
3' Vriend, supra note 9.
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been praised as a desirable policy of restraint by the courts, since the
alternative interpretation would involve striking the statute down.3'
Reading down has been used occasionally by the Court in
Charter cases, but the technique is more controversial in that context,
often dividing the Court. In Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v.
Canada (2000),32 the Little Sisters bookstore, which served the gay and
lesbian communities in Vancouver, challenged the applicable federal
customs legislation33 that prohibited the importation of obscene books
and magazines. The bookstore complained that the books and
magazines that it ordered were disproportionately withheld or delayed
by customs because of their gay and lesbian content. The Court held
that customs officials had breached the section 15 Charter guarantee of
equality by discriminating against the gay and lesbian communities.
HoWever, Justice Binnie, for the majority, took the view that that the
legislation itself was constitutional, and, if the customs officials applied
it correctly, the discrimination would disappear. He interpreted the
statutory definition of obscenity as "neutral" as between heterosexual
and gay and lesbian erotica. In making that assessment, Justice Binnie
employed the interpretive canon of reading down. Justice lacobucci,
with whom Justices Arbour and LeBel agreed, opposed the use of
"reading down" and took the view that the Court should strike down the
provision allowing customs to ban expressive materials. In their view,
much clearer direction was needed by customs officials, and only a
redrafted statute could provide that direction. Quoting from our article,
Justice Iacobucci said that striking down the existing provision would
foster a dialogue between the Court and Parliament, and require
Parliament to turn its mind to the issue of discrimination by officials and
enact corrective legislation.34
Justice Iacobucci returned to the same theme in Bell Express Vu
v. Rex (2002)."5 Now writing for the majority, he held that reading down
in Charter cases should be restricted to interpreting statutory language
-" Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 4th ed., looseleaf (Toronto: Carswell,
2006), c. 15.7 [Hogg, Constitutional Laul.
32 Little Sisters, supra note 9.
33 Customs Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1.
I4 Little Sisters, supra note 9 at 1257-58.
35 Bell ExpressVu, supra note. 9 at 598-99. Because this was the minority view, the
legislation was not struck down.
2007]
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that was genuinely ambiguous. While the common law should be
brought into conformity with "Charter values" in order to avoid
holdings of unconstitutionality, the same rule did not apply to statutes.
A broader general rule, requiring the courts to stretch the plausible
interpretation of a statute in order to bring it into conformity with the
Charter, "would wrongly upset the dialogic balance." When a statute is
unambiguous, courts should give effect to the clearly expressed
legislative intent, even if it leads to the conclusion that the statute was
unconstitutional and should be struck down for breach of the Charter.
This would force Parliament to revisit the issue and turn its mind to the
reasonable limits on the Charter right. In this way, "a forum for dialogue
among the branches of governance" would be retained.36
No reference was made to these counsels, or indeed to the idea
of dialogue, in Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law
v. Canada (2004)." 7 In that case, the Supreme Court of Canada was
invited to strike down section 43 of the Criminal Code,38 which provides
a defence to a charge of assault for teachers and parents who apply
"reasonable" force "by way of correction" against the children in their
charge. The appellant Foundation brought a challenge to the provision,
arguing that the law failed to provide meaningful standards for
disciplinary action by teachers and parents, in violation of section 7 of
the Charter. In sharp contrast to Bell Express Vu, Chief Justice
McLachlin, for the majority (which included Justice Iacobucci),
interpreted the provision as covering "only minor corrective force of a
transitory and trifling nature."39 She elaborated by explicitly ruling that
the provision would not cover corporal punishment of children under
two, or corporal punishment of teenagers, or discipline involving belts or
rulers or other objects, or blows or slaps to the head. So interpreted, the
law did provide meaningful standards and was accordingly upheld.
Justice Arbour, in dissent, pointed out that the restrictions on the law
that were stipulated by the Chief Justice had "not emerged from the
existing case law," and were "far from self-evident. 40 She would have
-6 Ibid. (The Court did not strike down the statutory provision in this ease for want of a
sufficient record to indicate that it offended the Charter.)
-7[2004] 1 S.C.R. 76.
38 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
39 Supra note 37 at 105.
40 Ibid. at 165.
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struck the provision down, leaving to Parliament the task of constructing
a more specific provision (or simply eliminating the defence). The other
dissenting judges, Justices Binnie and Deschamps, also regarded Chief
Justice McLachlin's reinterpretation of the section as tantamount to
judicial amendment and as encroaching on the proper role of
Parliament.4
There is, of course, no need to invoke the idea of dialogue in
order to insist that judges not engage in reconstructive surgery on
legislative provisions that would otherwise be unconstitutional. The
redrafting of unconstitutional laws is a legislative, not a judicial,
function. Nevertheless, the idea of dialogue is a useful way of
articulating the constraint that should be felt by judges. Where, after the
exercise of normal interpretation, a legislative provision is found to be
contrary to the Charter, the advantage of striking it down (and keeping
in mind that the declaration of invalidity can be suspended) is that the
reconstruction of the provision is remitted to the elected legislature. The
legislature will obviously have to overcome the constitutional infirmity
(unless a notwithstanding clause is used), which will entail working
within the guidelines established by the judicial decision that struck
down the law-that is the dialogue. But the final form of the corrective
law (and its section 1 justification) will be the responsibility of the
legislature. Recalling the point made in our 1997 article that there is
usually a variety of corrective options available to the legislature, the
idea of dialogue would normally be offended by a strained "reading
down" of an otherwise unconstitutional statutory text by a court.4" The
corrective law, if any, should not be designed by the court, but by the
legislature.
Ibid. at 122, Binnie J.; ibid. at 177, 188, Deschamps J.
42 Ironically, reading in, which involves the addition of words to the statute, is arguably less
intrusive, because the courts are aware of the radical nature of the remedy and use it only when
there is really only one practical solution to the constitutional defect-the normal range of
corrective options are not available. Vriend, supra note 9, was such a case, although even there
Justice Major preferred the suspended declaration of invalidity to the direct reading in, and
certainly that would have been the more deferential approach.
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C. Guiding Remedial Discretion
1. Justifying Suspended Declarations of Invalidity
Canadian courts used "suspended declarations of invalidity" in
constitutional cases long before the concept of "dialogue" was
introduced by our 1997 article. The first use seems to date from the
Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Re Manitoba Language Rights
(1985)," where the Court found that all of the laws enacted since 1890
by the Legislature of Manitoba were unconstitutional. Contrary to an
express constitutional requirement that the laws be enacted in French as
well as English, Manitoba's laws had been enacted in English only.
Faced with the prospect of a vacuum of provincial laws in Manitoba, the
Court assumed the power to hold that the unconstitutional laws were to
be given "temporary force and effect" for sufficient time to allow the
legislature time to enact, in both languages, the required corrective
legislation. At the time, this was considered a novel and radical exercise
of judicial power, because a body of unconstitutional law was
maintained in force solely by virtue of the Court's order. This was not a
Charter case, but, after the decision, the suspended declaration of
invalidity was used in several Charter cases where the normal remedy of
an immediate declaration of invalidity would give rise to serious
consequences, such as an inability to hold an election," the release from
custody of people who had committed serious crimes," and the
destruction of a beneficial social program.
46
For some time after the Manitoba Language Rights case, the
suspended declaration of invalidity continued to be viewed as a radical
remedy to be sparingly applied. This was the view of Chief Justice
Lamer in Schachter v. Canada (1982). 4" Writing for the majority, he
suggested "guidelines" to limit the cases where a suspended declaration
of invalidity could properly be ordered. The appropriate cases were
where the immediate striking down of the legislation (1) "would pose a
4-[1985] 1 S.C.R. 721 [Manitoba Language Rights].
'Dixon v. B.C. (Attorney General) (1989), 59 D.L.R. (4th) 247 (B.C.S.C.).
45 R. v. Swain, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 933.
46[1992] 2 S.C.R. 679 [Schachte].
47 Ibid.
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danger to the public," (2) "would threaten the rule of law," or (3)
"would result in the deprivation of benefits from deserving persons."'
The three Schachter "guidelines" essentially limited the courts'
use of suspended declarations of invalidity to exigent situations where
danger, disorder, or deprivation would be caused by an immediate
declaration of invalidity. The guidelines explained most (but not all)49 of
the suspended declarations of invalidity that had been issued by the
Supreme Court of Canada before Schachter. More recently, however,
there has been a rethinking of the place of suspended declarations of
invalidity in Charter jurisprudence. While a few of the subsequent cases
fit the guidelines,5" Sujit Choudhry and Kent Roach are right to note
that the guidelines "have largely been ignored in subsequent cases."51
This is because a new rationale, which can be captured by the word
"dialogue," now governs the discretion of the Court. The new rationale
is simply that, in many cases-where the Court has found a law to be
unconstitutional, the Court considers the legislature to be better placed
than the Court to design the appropriate remedy. "The suspended
declaration of invalidity can be viewed as a form of legislative remand,
whereby unconstitutional legislation is sent back for reconsideration in
light of the court's judgment."5 This is not an abdication of
4 Ibid. at 719.
' R. v. Bain, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 91 (suspended declaration of invalidity for jury selection
provisions). Although decided only six months before Schachter, this case does not fit any of the
guidelines.
o Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince Edward Island
(No. 2), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 3 at 19-20 (suspending for one year the requirement of a judicial
compensation commission necessary for judicial independence so that "the orderly administration
of justice is not disrupted in the interim") would come within guideline (2). M v. H, supra note 9 at
87 (suspending for six months a declaration of invalidity of opposite-sex definition of "spouse"
because its repair was complicated and support obligations between common law spouses would be
interrupted) would come within guideline (3). Nova Scotia (Workers' Compensation Board) v.
Martin, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 504 at 578-79 (suspending for six months a declaration of invalidity of
chronic pain provisions of workers' compensation scheme "to preserve the limited benefits of the
current program until an appropriate legislative response to chronic pain can be implemented")
would come within guideline (3).
' Sujit Choudhry & Kent Roach, "Putting the Past Behind Us?" (2003) 21 Sup. Ct. L. Rev.
(2d) 205 at 232. This article lists all the suspended declarations of invalidity that had been issued by
Canadian courts up to the date of the article (see Table A at 253-54). There are forty-two of them,
of which sixteen were issued by the Supreme Court of Canada. See also Bruce Ryder, "Suspending
the Charter" (2003) 21 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 267, which also has an appendix listing all the
declarations of invalidity (immediate and suspended) in the Supreme Court of Canada.
5 2Choudhry & Roach, ibid. at 233.
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responsibility by the Court because if the legislature chooses to take no
action during the period of suspension, the Court's declaration of
invalidity will take effect. 3 But, the period of suspension gives to the
legislature the first opportunity to remedy the constitutional wrong.
For example, in Re Eurig Estate (1998), 54 where the Supreme
Court of Canada invalidated Ontario's probate fees (admittedly, not on
Charter grounds), the Court suspended the declaration of invalidity for
six months, citing only the potential loss of revenue to the province. In
Corbiere v. Canada (1999),"5 where the Court invalidated the on-reserve
residence requirements in the Indian Act 56 for Indian band elections,
the Court suspended the declaration of invalidity for eighteen months to
enable new provisions to be drafted after consultation with Aboriginal
people. In United Food and Commercial Workers International Union,
Local 1518 v. KMart Canada Ltd. (1999),"7 where the Court invalidated
an overly broad prohibition of secondary picketing, the Court suspended
the declaration of invalidity for six months to allow time for a new
provision to be drafted. In Dunmore v. Ontario (2001),8 where the
Court invalidated a provision excluding agricultural workers from
Ontario's labour relations statute, the Court suspended the declaration
of invalidity for eighteen months to allow time for amending legislation
to be drafted and enacted. In R. v. Guignard (2002)," 9 where the Court
invalidated a bylaw restricting advertising signs in the municipality, the
Court suspended the declaration of invalidity for six months to allow
time to redraft the bylaw. In Trociuk v. British Columbia (Attorney
General) (2003), 6 where the Court invalidated powers given to a
mother but not a father in a provincial birth registration law, the Court
suspended the declaration of invalidity for twelve months to allow time
to redraft the law. In Figueroa v. Canada (Attorney General) (2003),61
where the Court invalidated restrictions that disqualified small political
5 3 Ryder, supra note 51 at 282, suggests that it is a "partial" abdication of responsibility.
s [1998] 2 S.C.R. 565 at 586.
s Corbiere, supra note 9 at 226, 284-85.
56 R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-5.
-z[1999] 2 S.C.R. 1083 at 1133.
58 [2001] 3 S.C.R. 1016 at 1077-78.
s [2002] 1 S.C.R. 472 at 488-89.
[2003] 1 S.C.R. 835 at 854.
61 [2003] 1 S.C.R. 912 at 964.
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parties from registration for the purpose of federal elections, the Court
suspended the declaration of invalidity for twelve months "in order to
enable the government to comply with these reasons."
In each of these post-Schachter cases, there was a variety of
solutions available to the competent legislative body to correct the
constitutional defect. What the court was saying was that it is better "to
offer legislatures the opportunity to make the initial choice among those
competing alternatives."62 Of course, the legislative body could, and
probably would, still act even if the declaration of invalidity were given
immediate effect, but an immediate declaration of invalidity would leave
a gap in the law for the period required to draft and enact new
legislation. Obviously, the Court was implicitly acknowledging that the
preservation in force of an unconstitutional law was preferable to the
legal discontinuity that would otherwise result.63 However, in none of
the cases described above did the gap in the law give rise to the exigent
circumstances that, according to Schachter, were required to justify the
postponement of a declaration of invalidity. With one exception, none
of the cases offered an alternative rationale for postponing the
declaration of invalidity. The exception was Corbiere,4 where the
concurring opinion of Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 articulated the dialogue
rationale for the postponement of the declaration. She pointed out that
there were numerous ways in which the unconstitutional on-reserve
residence requirement for Indian Act elections could be corrected, and
that the best solution would be the one determined by Parliament after
consulting with the Aboriginal people who were affected by the
decision. In her view, the principle of democracy should guide the
exercise of the Court's remedial discretion, and that principle
"encourages remedies that allow the democratic process of consultation
and dialogue to occur."65 The suspension of the declaration of invalidity
for eighteen months in that case gave Parliament time to develop and
enact a new voting regime, should it choose to do so. If Parliament
decided not to act, the Court's declaration of invalidity of the residence
62 Ryder, supra note 51 at 275.
63 Ibid. at 283. Ryder criticizes the Court for its casual approach to the suspension of
declarations of invalidity, and argues that the Court should require government to demonstrate that
the costs of an immediate declaration outweigh the benefits of a suspended declaration.
' Corbiere, supra note 9.
6
5 Ibid. at 283.
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requirement would take effect after eighteen months, enfranchising for
all purposes those band members who lived off the reserve.
We conclude that the idea of dialogue has been influential in
guiding the courts in their increasing use of suspended declarations of
invalidity. A purpose of the suspension, and often the only purpose, is to
enable the legislature to respond directly to a holding of invalidity. The
court recognizes that a range of corrective laws is possible, and that the
legislature is better placed than the court to select the appropriate
remedy. Although the unconstitutional law is maintained in force for a
short time, the Charter is still respected, because if no new law is
enacted by the time the period of suspension ends, the declaration of
invalidity takes effect. If a new law is enacted in response to the holding
of invalidity, that law must comply with the Charter.
2. Guiding Remedial Discretion Under Section 24 of the Charter
The Supreme Court's allusions to dialogue in connection with
suspending a declaration of invalidity in Corbiere can be seen as an
appropriate influence in guiding other remedial discretions. Another
remedial discretion, which is created by the express words of section 24
of the Charter, is the grant to "a court of competent jurisdiction" of the
power to correct a breach of the Charter by granting "such remedy as
the court considers appropriate and just in the circumstances."66
Judicial respect for the superior competence of the legislative
and executive branches in matters of policy and administration underlies
suspended declarations of invalidity. The same respect would argue for
restraint in the crafting of orders under section 24 to compel the
executive branch to rectify Charter breaches. For the most part, that has
been the pattern of remedial discretion under section 24.67 However, a
remarkable exception to the pattern of restraint is Doucet-Boudreau v.
Nova Scotia (2003),68 where a trial judge, acting under section 24, issued
an order requiring the province of Nova Scotia to build five French-
language schools and to develop related curriculum. As a remedy for the
province's breach of minority language educational rights, this was not
unusual. What was unusual was the judge's supervision of the
6 Supra note 2, s. 24.
6 The cases are described in Hogg, ConstitutionalLaw, supra note 31, c. 37.2.
-[2003] 3 S.C.R. 3.
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government's compliance with the order. The judge remained seized of
the case: he required the government to file regular progress reports on
the construction and curriculum projects and held regular "reporting
hearings" at which affidavit evidence was provided and cross-
examination of deponents took place. This supervisory process was
upheld by the Court, despite the fact that the only possible reason for it
was a fear that the province would refuse to comply with the section 24
order-something that had never yet occurred in Canada. Justices
Iacobucci and Arbour, writing for the majority, were obviously troubled
by their espousal of dialogue in other contexts and their affirmation of
the draconian supervisory order in this case. They said that "judicial
restraint and metaphors such as 'dialogue' must not be elevated to the
level of strict constitutional rules to which the words of section 24 can be
subordinated."69 We would only comment that there is no need to
elevate dialogue to the level of a strict constitutional rule in order for
the courts to exercise their remedial discretion under section 24 with
due respect for the competence and good faith of the executive branch.
D. Justifying Judicial Discretion in "Second Look" Cases
The Supreme Court of Canada has also reflected on the idea of
dialogue in several so-called "second look" cases, which are cases where
the Court reviews the validity of legislation enacted to replace a law
struck down in a previous Charter decision. In some second look cases,
the majority of the Court has invoked the notion of dialogue as a reason
for deferring to the legislative judgment and upholding the second law.
In other second look cases, the majority of the Court has reminded us
that dialogue does not mean that the Court should automatically defer
to the legislature simply because the legislature has revised and re-
enacted a law previously struck down by the Court.
The first second look case in which the Court explicitly invoked
the notion of dialogue70 was R. v. Mills (1999).71 At issue in Mills was the
69 Ibid at 36-37.
'This was not the first second look case decided by the Court (it was the third), but it was
the first second look case in which the Court invoked the notion of dialogue. In Baron v. Canada,
[1993] 1 S.C.R. 416, the Court held unconstitutional (for breach of section 8 of the Charter) the
procedure for obtaining search warrants set out in the Income TaxAct, R.S.C. 1985, c. 63, s. 231.3,
as am. by S.C. 1986, c. 6, s. 121 (ITA). This procedure was enacted in response to the decisions in
MN.R. v. Kruger, [1984] 2 F.C. 535 (C.A.) and Reference Re Print Three Inc. (1985), 51 O.R. (2d)
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validity of a 1997 statutory regime for the disclosure to the accused of
confidential records in sexual assault cases. The Court had addressed
the issue of disclosure two years earlier in R. v. O'Connor (1995).71 In
O'Connor, the Court held unanimously that access to private records in
the possession of third parties could be necessary to an accused's right
under section 7 to make full answer and defence. However, this did not
give an accused person an automatic right of access to the records.
Rather, the Court ruled that production must be governed by a
procedure which would strike the proper balance between the accused's
right under section 7 to make full answer and defence (which called for
disclosure) and the complainant's rights under section 8 to privacy and
under section 15 to equality (which called for confidentiality). The
Court divided five to four on how to achieve this balance, with the
minority setting down standards for judicially supervised disclosure that
called for significantly more restrictive access to records than that
provided for under the procedures laid down by the majority.73
After the decision in O'Connor, Parliament replaced the
judicially imposed process with the 1997 statutory regime for the
disclosure of confidential records in sexual assault cases.74 The statutory
regime followed the dissenting opinion of Justice L'Heureux-Dub6
much more closely than the majority opinion, with the result that there
was a strong likelihood that in some cases records that the majority of
the Court in O'Connor had assumed would be needed by the accused in
order to make full answer and defence would be withheld in the
321 (C.A.). The ITA was amended by S.C. 1994, c. 21, s. 108. In R. v. Pontes, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 44, a
slim 5-4 majority of the Court held that the Motor Vehicle Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 288, was not
unconstitutional (for breach of section 7 of the Charter), even though driving with a suspended
licence remained an absolute liability offence, something that was held to be unconstitutional (for
breach of section 7) in Reference Re Section 94(2) of the B. C Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 S.C.R.
486, because section 4.1 of the Offence Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 305 could be used to "read down" a
penalty of imprisonment for that offence.
7' Mills, supra note 9.
-'[1995] 4 S.C.R. 411.
' The majority opinion was written by Chief Justice Lamer and Justice Sopinka, and
attracted the support of Justices Cory, lacobucci, and Major. The main dissenting opinion was
written by Justice L'Heureux-Dub6, and attracted the support of Justices La Forest and Gonthier.
Justice McLachlin wrote a separate dissent in which she agreed wholly with Justice L'Heureux-
Dub6.
74 S.C. 1997, c. 30, s. 278.1.
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interests of the privacy and equality rights of the complainants.75 The
statute contained a lengthy preamble, reciting Parliament's concern with
the prevalence of sexual violence against women and children, and the
risk that the reporting of incidents of sexual violence would be deterred
by the compelled production of records revealing personal information
about complainants. The preamble had obviously been inserted with a
view to supporting a section 1 justification in the event of a
constitutional challenge.
In Mills, the Court upheld the 1997 statutory scheme, but the
reasoning was surprising because it was not based on a section 1
analysis. Instead, the Court repeatedly invoked the concept of dialogue
as a reason for deferring to Parliament's judgment-not its judgment as
to legislative objective and the other elements of the section 1
justification, but its judgment as to where to draw the line between the
competing rights. The Court, speaking through Justice McLachlin, as
she then was (who had dissented in O'Connor), and Justice Iacobucci
(who had been in the majority in O'Connor), said that O'Connor was
"not necessarily the last word on the subject," and that "the law
develops through a dialogue between courts and legislatures."76 The
Court pointed to a long process of consultation that had preceded the
enactment of the statute, which had allowed time for Parliament to
consider the constitutional standards laid down in O'Connor and also to
consider how well they were working in practice. The Court described
this process of consultation as "a notable example of the dialogue
between the judicial and legislative branches."77 What the Court in
O'Connor had regarded as "preferable" was not a "rigid constitutional
template," but a common-law interpretation of the Charter that "does
not preclude Parliament from coming to a different conclusion ... ,,78
The Court concluded that the statute should be upheld.
In the second look cases decided since Mills, the Court has
divided sharply on the degree of deference that a second try by
s The differences between the O'Connor regime and the statutory regime are related in
more detail in Hogg, supra note 31, c. 44, "Fundamental Justice," s. 44.19(0. See also Cameron,
"Dialogue and Hierarchy," supra note 15; Manfredi & Kelly, "Dialogue, Deference and Restraint,"
supra note 17 at 331-36.
6 Mills, supra note 9 at 689.
7 ibid at 745.
I Ibid. at 749. For further comments on relating to dialogue, see also 711, 753-54.
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Parliament or a provincial legislature should receive from the Court. In
R. v. Hall (2002), 79 the Court reviewed a second attempt by Parliament
to define the grounds for denying bail to an accused person in custody.
In an earlier case, R. v. Morales (1992),8" the Court had struck down a
provision of the Criminal Code that authorized the denial of bail when
the continued detention of an accused person was "necessary in the
public interest." The Court held that the phrase was too vague to satisfy
section 11(e) of the Charter, which prohibits the denial of bail without
just cause. After this decision, Parliament replaced the invalid public
interest ground with a new provision that authorized the denial of bail
"on any other just cause being shown and, without limiting the
generality of the foregoing, where the detention is necessary in order to
maintain confidence in the administration of justice."'" In Hall, the
Court unanimously held that the general phrase "on any other just cause
being shown" was, like its public interest predecessor, unconstitutionally
vague. But the Court divided five to four on the validity of the more
specific ground, which authorized the denial of bail in order to maintain
confidence in the administration of justice. Chief Justice McLachlin, for
the majority, upheld the provision as being sufficiently precise to pass
constitutional muster under section 11(e). She pointed out that
Parliament, before enacting the challenged language, had taken into
account the Court's reasons in Morales. She described the legislative
outcome as "an excellent example" of the "constitutional dialogue"
between the courts and Parliament. 2 But Justice Iacobucci, for the
minority, held that the "administration of justice" language was still
unconstitutionally vague. In his view, the case demonstrated how
"constitutional dialogue can break down."83 Although Parliament had
responded to the Court's decision in Morales, "it [had] not done so with
due regard for the constitutional standards set out in that case."' In
upholding the new provision, he sharply criticized the majority decision
as having "transformed dialogue into abdication."85
9 Hall, supra note 9.
&I[19921 3 S.C.R. 711.
8) Supra note 38, s. 515(10), as am. by S.C. 1997, c. 18, s. 59.
8 Hal, supra note 9 at 333-34.
83 Ibid. at 369.
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid. at 370.
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Sauvd v. Canada (2002),86 released just three weeks after Hall,
reviewed a second attempt by Parliament to impose voting
disqualifications on prisoners. In earlier litigation by the same litigant,
the Court had struck down a provision of the Canada Elections Act 87
that disqualified all persons serving prison sentences from voting in
federal elections.8 The Court had held that the disqualification
infringed the right to vote in section 3 of the Charter and was not
justified under section 1. After this provision was struck down,
Parliament amended the legislation to narrow the disqualification to
prisoners serving a sentence of two years or more. 9 When the
constitutional challenge to the new provision reached the Court,
Parliament conceded that the new provision infringed section 3, and the
issue before the Court was whether the infringement was justified under
section 1. On that issue, the Court divided five to four, with the majority
holding that the law was not justified under section 1. Justice Gonthier,
writing for the four dissenters, invoked the concept of dialogue to argue
that the Court should defer to Parliament's judgment as to what was a
reasonable limit on the right to vote. Once Parliament had debated the
issue, the dialogue metaphor suggested that the Court should not
substitute its view for Parliament's reasonable choices among social and
political philosophies. According to Justice Gonthier, this was a case
where the Court "lets Parliament have the last word."90 After Hall, one
might have expected Chief Justice McLachlin to agree with this
reasoning, but in Sauv& she took a very different line. Writing for the
majority (which included Justice Iacobucci), she described the section 3
right to vote as "fundamental to our democracy" and of "special
importance," and said that any limits on the right "require not
deference, but careful examination."9' Echoing the strong language of
Justice Iacobucci in Hall, she said: "The healthy and important
8 6 Sauvg supra note 9.
8 7R.S.C. 1985, c. E-2, s. 51(e), rep. & sub. S.C., 1993, c. 19, s. 23(2).
Sauv6 v. Canada, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 438.
89 The amendment had been enacted by the time the first appeal reached the Supreme
Court of Canada, but it was not applicable to the appeal and the Court did not comment on it.
Thus, a further challenge was necessary.
, Sauv4 supra note 9 at 576-77.
91 Ibid. at 535, 536. Notably, the right to vote is one of the rights that is not subject to the
section 33 override.
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promotion of a dialogue between the legislature and the courts should
not be debased to a rule of 'if at first you don't succeed, try, try again."'92
She dismissed the parliamentary debates as offering "more fulmination
than illumination."93 She described the reasons given by government for
limiting the right (enhancing civic responsibility, promoting respect for
the rule of law, and strengthening the criminal sanction) as merely
"symbolic," "abstract," and "rhetorical," and she concluded that there
was no pressing and substantial objective that would justify limiting the
right.94 The conclusion was that all persons serving prison sentences
must be given the right to vote, notwithstanding that Parliament had
made a clear choice, informed by the Court's previous decision, to limit
that right.
Harper v. Canada (2004) 9" reviewed a second attempt by
Parliament to impose a ceiling on election expenditures by third parties
(ie. persons other than registered political parties and their candidates).
Parliament had reformed the law in response to the Court's decision in
Libman v. Ouebec (Attorney General) (1997),96 which struck down a
prohibition on expenditures by persons who fell outside the umbrella of
the "yes" or "no" side of a referendum campaign, and the Alberta Court
of Appeal's decision in Somerville v. Canada (Attorney General)
(1996), 97 which struck down a third-party election expenditure
restriction of one thousand dollars. Following these decisions,
Parliament amended the Canada Elections Act, by raising the ceiling on
third-party election expenditures from the one thousand dollars that had
been struck down in Somerville to a total of $150,000, of which no more
than three thousand dollars could be incurred in a single electoral
district. These restrictions, like their more draconian predecessors,
essentially made election campaigns the exclusive reserve of registered
political parties and their candidates, who were also subject to spending
limits, but limits that were more than sixty times greater. There was no
doubt that the third-party expenditure restrictions were limits on
92 Ibid. at 538.
93 Ibid. at 540.
94 Ibid. at 540-42.
'Harper, supra note 9.
[11997] 3 S.C.R. 569.
-(1996), 184 A.R. 241 (C.A.).
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freedom of expression, contrary to section 2(b) of the Charter. But were
they saved by section 1?
In Harper, the Court, by a majority of six to three, said yes.
Although there was no evidence that in election campaigns the voices of
the wealthy drowned out those of others, the Court accepted that the
prevention of that evil was the objective of the restrictions, and that the
objective was sufficiently important to justify limiting freedom of
expression. Where the Court divided was on the minimum impairment
branch of the Oakes test. Did the statutory restrictions impair the right
of free expression as little as reasonably possible? Justice Bastarache,
writing for the majority, suggested that, given the difficulties inherent in
balancing the rights and privileges of all the participants in the electoral
process, it was appropriate to approach the justification analysis with
deference. He held that the statutory restrictions impaired the right of
free expression as little as reasonably possible, and were justified under
section 1. He did not invoke the notion of dialogue to support this
deferential approach. Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice Major,
writing for the minority, rejected the deferential approach to the
justification analysis and emphasized that limits on political speech (the
type of speech in issue) "must be supported by a clear and convincing
demonstration that they are necessary, do not go too far, and enhance
more than harm the democratic process."98 The argument of good faith,
said to be "evidenced by the ongoing dialogue with the courts as to
where the limits should be set," was rejected, on the basis that "good
faith cannot remedy an impairment of the right to freedom of
expression."99
These decisions make it clear that the Court is struggling to
determine how it should approach second look cases. This is hardly
surprising, since second look cases bring into stark relief issues relating
to the proper boundary between elected legislatures and unelected
judges. In the last section of this article, we offer our suggestions as to
how the Court should approach second look cases in light of the notion
of dialogue.
98 Harper, Supra note 9 at 843-44.
99 Ibid. at 848-49.
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III. DIALOGUE IN THE ACADEMIC LITERATURE
In this part, we will attempt to address criticisms of our 1997
article that have been made in the academic literature. The academic
literature has taken on avalanche proportions, and all that we can do is
attempt to categorize and to answer the main lines of criticism.
However, before doing so, we feel that it is appropriate to make several
preliminary observations about the criticisms in general, in order to
provide some context.
First, as previously noted, many of the criticisms focus on our
use of the word "dialogue," often by analyzing what is required (at least
in the view of the critics) to engage in some idealized notion of
"dialogue," and then criticizing our notion of dialogue because it does
not fit this idealized notion. This approach is misguided. The essential
point of "Charter Dialogue" was that Charter decisions usually leave
room for a legislative response, and usually receive a legislative
response. We used the word "dialogue" to describe the recurring
sequence of judicial decision followed by legislative amendment that we
observed and documented. We never made the ridiculous suggestion
that courts and legislatures were actually "talking" to each other.
Whether dialogue is the proper word to use to describe the
phenomenon we observed is a question upon which anyone may
disagree. We would cheerfully adopt another word if we were persuaded
that another word is better, but no one has so far suggested a better
word. This article will therefore not agonize over the word "dialogue,"
but rather reiterate the substantive thesis of the 1997 article-that
Canada has only a weak form of judicial review, because Charter
decisions usually leave room for a legislative response and usually
receive a legislative response.
Second, the notion of dialogue that we proposed in "Charter
Dialogue" was descriptive rather than normative. We described how
legislatures didbehave-rather than how they shouldbehave-following
a court decision striking down one of their laws on Charter grounds. We
have since come to appreciate that the notion of dialogue may also have
some limited normative content, and we have also come to appreciate
that dialogue may influence courts as well as legislatures-something we
did not anticipate in 1997. Both of these ideas have been introduced in
Part II, above, discussing dialogue in the Supreme Court of Canada.
This article will continue to discuss the limited ways in which the notion
[VOL. 45, NO. I
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of dialogue should influence institutional behaviour following a Charter
decision striking down a law.
Third, and finally, the notion of dialogue has encountered
aggressive criticism from those critics who see a political bias embedded
in the Court's decision making. This is perhaps unsurprising. The idea
that legislatures can, and usually do, respond to judicial decisions
invalidating a piece of legislation for inconsistency with the Charter
poses a serious challenge to Charter skeptics on both the right and the
left end of the political spectrum. If, for example, unpopular judicial
decisions that have the effect of advancing a "progressive" social or
economic agenda can be modified or overridden by the competent
legislative body, it becomes much less significant whether those'
decisions have been achieved through the efforts of an unrepresentative,
unaccountable, left-leaning "Court party" (per Morton and Knopff).0°
Similarly, if unpopular judicial decisions that have the effect of
advancing a "conservative" social or economic agenda can be modified
or overridden by the competent legislative body, it becomes much less
significant whether those decisions reflect the social and economic
assumptions of unrepresentative, unaccountable, middle-aged, affluent,
conservative judges (per Petter). 101
A. Justifying Judicial Review
The first, and most fundamental, line of criticism is that the 1997
article fails to justify judicial review under the Charter. Andrew Petter
says that "dialogue theory lacks normative content, and exerts no moral
claim to support judges' involvement in Charter decision-making."102
Keith Ewing takes the same view, saying that "[i]f judicial review of
legislation is to be justified, it must be for reasons of principle which are
intrinsic to the process itself ...."103 Petter and Ewing are quite right.
The justifications for judicial review under the Charter do not include
"'s°Supra note 16.
"o' Andrew Petter, "Twenty Years of Charter Justification: From Liberal Legalism to
Dubious Dialogue" (2003) 52 U.N.B.L.J. 187.
102 Ibid. at 196.
103 Keith Ewing, "Human Rights" in Peter Cane & Mark Tushnet, eds., The Oxford
Handbook of Legal Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) 298 at 309.
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dialogue theory."° As Kent Roach has noted, "[d]ialogue theory is not a
theory of judicial review," and thus it is still necessary to justify "giving
the unelected judiciary [a] role in the political dialogue about rights and
freedoms.""1 5
The moral justification for judicial review is the idea that
individuals have rights that must be "taken seriously," which means that
they cannot be taken away simply by an appeal to the general welfare." 6
The political justification for judicial review is that Canada adopted the
Charter in 1982 after extensive public debate, which included articulate
objections to the idea of judicial review. Although the government of
Quebec did not agree to the Charter in 1982, and (perhaps for that
reason) no referendum was held to approve its terms, its approval was
part of a democratic process that culminated in the approval of the
Parliament of Canada. Moreover, since 1982, polls have consistently
shown high levels of popular support both for the Charter and for
judicial review of legislation by the Supreme Court of Canada."7 The
legal justification for judicial review is that the Charter is now part of
the constitution, and the constitution provides, by section 52, that any
law that is inconsistent with the constitution is "of no force or effect."
That language is, in our tradition, a clear mandate for judicial review.
Reasonable people can hold the view that rights can be
adequately protected by legislatures without judicial review. Reasonable
10 The same conclusion is reached by Luc Tremblay. See Luc B. Tremblay, "The
Legitimacy of Judicial Review: The Limits of Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures" (2005) 3
Int'l J. Const. L. 617.
"0 Kent Roach, "Dialogic Judicial Review and its Critics" (2004) 23 Sup. Ct. L.°Rev. (2d)
49 at 51 [Roach, "Dialogic Judicial Review"].
106 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London: Duckworth, 1977), c. 7. The chapter
was originally published in the New York Review of Books.
17 Jeremy Waldron has criticized the suggestion that judicial review is democratic because
it was the result of a democratic process. "[I]f the people want a regime of constitutional rights,
then that is what they should have: democracy requires that. But we must not confuse the reason
for carrying out a proposal with the character of the proposal itself. If the people wanted to
experiment with dictatorship, principles of democracy might give us a reason to allow them to do
so. But it would not follow that dictatorship is democratic." See "A Right-Based Critique of
Constitutional Rights" (1993) Oxford J. Legal Stud. 18 at 46 [emphasis in original]. However, as
Jeffrey Goldsworthy reminds us, under the Charter, "[tlhe transfer of power to the judges is more
like a delegation of power to make decisions that can be overridden by the legislature, just as it can
override the exercise of powers it has delegated to the executive. The 'democratic' justification of
entrenched constitutional rights then stands undefeated." See "Judicial Review, Legislative
Override, and Democracy" (2003) 38 Wake Forest L. Rev. 451 at 459.
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people can believe that the debate in 1982 should have gone the other
way, and that it was a mistake to entrench the Charter into the
constitution. Reasonable people can prefer a parliamentary democracy
to a constitutional democracy. But those points of view were carefully
considered and deliberately rejected in 1982. Canadians decided then
that some rights were so important that they should be protected from
the regular process of majoritarian politics. Canadians decided then to
require the courts to review government laws and actions for
compliance with the Charter. Canadians knew then, from their
experience with sections 91 and 92 (the federalism provisions), as well as
from their knowledge of the experience of judicial review under the U.S.
Bill of Rights, that judicial review would take constitutional provisions
down paths that are somewhat unpredictable. Canadians knew then that
they were giving their courts a larger role in shaping the public policy of
the nation than they ever had before. Nevertheless, Canadians decided
to adopt a constitutional Charter anyway. It is not going to go away!
Dialogue theory does not provide a justification for judicial
review. The justification rests on the moral, political, and legal
justifications for judicial review described in the two paragraphs above.
What " Charter Dialogue" demonstrated was not that judicial review was
good, but that judicial review under the Charter was weaker than is
generally supposed. Those who would prefer Canada to revert to a
simple parliamentary democracy can take some comfort from our 1997
article. That article showed that that the combined effects of the
limitation clause (section 1), the override clause (section 33), and other
provisions of the Charter meant that a judicial decision striking down a
law did not need to be the last word, and usually was not the last word.
The competent legislative body usually could, and usually did, replace a
law that had been struck down with a valid law that accomplished the
main objectives of the original invalid law. "Charter Dialogue" showed
that what we adopted in 1982 was a halfway house between the strong
form of judicial review typified by the United States and the statutory
bill of rights typified by the Canadian Bill of Rights" of 1960.09 It is
obviously much easier to justify a weak form of judicial review than a
"S.C. 1960, c. 44.
1o For a detailed discussion of these new "Commonwealth bills of rights," see Stephen
Gardbaum, "The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism" (2001) 49 Am. J. Comp. L.
707.
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strong form, because the influence of the unelected courts on public
policy is much less when the courts' powers to review the laws enacted
by the elected legislative bodies are only of the weak Canadian kind.
When judicial decisions apply the Charter to strike down laws that are
supported by popular sentiment (whether that sentiment is consistently
"progressive," as some critics assume, or consistently "conservative," as
others assume), the laws can normally be restored in substance by the
competent elected legislative assembly.
B. FinalAuthority to Interpret the Charter
A second major line of criticism is that dialogue does not, and
cannot, exist where final authority to interpret the Charter is vested in
the courts. Christopher Manfredi and James Kelly, for example, suggest
that the notion of dialogue is "flawed" because dialogue supporters
assume "a judicial monopoly on correct interpretation," and argue that
"[g]enuine dialogue only exists when legislatures are recognized as
legitimate interpreters of the constitution and have an effective means
to assert that interpretation." ''1 Manfredi criticizes the notion of
UO Manfredi & Kelly, "Six Degrees of Dialogue," supra note 17 at 523-24 [emphasis in
original]; Manfredi & Kelly, "Dialogue, Deference and Restraint," supra note 17.
The idea that legislatures should be recognized as legitimate interpreters of the
constitution is not new. The idea, known as coordinate construction, was argued, with respect to the
U.S. Constitution, by Thomas Jefferson (see John Agresto, The Supreme Court and Constitutional
Democracy(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984) at 78-86), James Madison (see Robert A. Burt,
The Constitution in Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), c. 2), Abraham Lincoln
(denying that the Supreme Court's decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393
(1857) was binding on the President, Congress, and the voters), and Franklin D. Roosevelt (denying
that the Supreme Court's decisions striking down the New Deal legislation were binding on the
President, Congress, and the voters). However, after a period of relative neglect, the idea has been
making somewhat of "an academic comeback," first in the United States, with respect to the U.S.
Constitution, and now in Canada, with respect to the Charter. The notion of coordinate
construction has been revitalized, in particular, by popular constitutionalists who call for a
"reassertion" of the involvement of "the People" in constitutional interpretation.
Some examples of the American academic commentary espousing coordinate construction:
Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1999) [Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Awa]; Mark Tushnet, "Non-Judicial Review"
(2003) 40 Harv. J. on Leg. 453 [Tushnet, "Non-Judicial Review"]; and Larry D. Kramer,
"Foreword: We the Court" (2001) 115 Harv. L. Rev. 4. Some examples of the American academic
commentary rejecting coordinate construction: Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, "On
Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation" (1997) 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1359; Larry Alexander &
Frederick Schauer, "Defending Judicial Supremacy: A Reply" (2000) 17 Const. Commentary 455;
and Larry -Alexander, "Constitutional Rules, Constitutional Standards, and Constitutional
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dialogue because it equates judicial interpretation of the Charter with
the Charter itself and, in so doing, does not give Parliament or the
provincial legislatures credit for having a role in giving meaning to
Charter values that is independent of judicial views."' Rainer Knopff
says that "[t]he problem with contemporary Canadian dialogue
theorists" is that they "want to retain judicial finality in interpreting the
Constitution even as they deny judicial supremacy over policy
outcomes."'
12
We would comment, first of all, that this is a semantic point. If
"genuine dialogue" can only occur where legislatures share coordinate
authority with the courts to interpret the constitution, then by definition
it cannot exist in Canada, where legislatures have no such authority.
Underlying the criticism, however, is a preference for a different
constitutional order, and it is that preference that we will go on to
discuss.
Our position is that the final authority to interpret the Charter
rests properly with the judiciary (or, to put it differently, that judicial
interpretation of the Charter is authoritative). In our view, societies that
have a written bill of rights will require some body or institution to have
the final authority to say what the bill of rights means, otherwise there
would be a possibility for "interpretative anarchy."1 3 In Canada, that
task falls, and should continue to fall, to the courts. There are problems,
to be sure, with giving this task to the courts, but for the reasons
Settlement: Marbury v. Madison and the Case for Judicial Supremacy" (2003) 20 Const.
Commentary 369.
For an account of the "academic comeback" of the idea, see Kent Roach,
"Constitutional and Common Law Dialogues Between the Supreme Court and Canadian
Legislatures" (2001) 80 Can. Bar Rev. 481 at 490-93; Kent Roach The Supreme Court on Trial:
Judicial Activism or Democratic Dialogue (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2001), 241-43 [Roach, The
Supreme Court on Trial.
n" Manfredi, JudicialPower, supra note 25 at 178-79.
112 Rainer Knopff, "How Democratic is the Charter? And Does it Matter?" (2003) 19 Sup.
Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 199 at 212 [emphasis in original].
" Alexander & Schauer, "On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation," supra note 110
at 1379 (describing the "protestant view" of constitutional interpretation, which entails parity of
interpretive authority between the three branches of government, as leading to "interpretative
anarchy").
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outlined below, the judicial branch is likely the "least dangerous branch"
to charge with offering a final interpretation of the Charter."'
We agree with the critics that, while assuming judicial supremacy
over the interpretation of the Charter, we deny judicial supremacy over
policy outcomes. In our view, although the legislative and executive
branches are bound by judicial interpretations of the Charter,
legislatures usually have the ability to respond, and usually do respond,
to judicial decisions invalidating a legislative provision for inconsistency
with the Charter. This was the whole point of "Charter Dialogue," and
indeed the appendix to it (which describes the sequels to all the Charter
decisions) demonstrates conclusively that the policy outcomes are
usually not those dictated by the courts.
We disagree with the suggestion that we assume a judicial
monopoly on correct interpretation of the Charter. What we assume is a
judicial monopoly on final interpretation of the Charter. We do not
deny that the courts sometimes get it wrong. We each have a Charter
decision or two that we think was incorrectly decided.1 5 All that was
argued in "Charter Dialogue," and again in the 1999 response to
Manfredi and Kelly, was that the Charter decisions of the courts,
whether right or wrong, rarely preclude a legislative sequel, and usually
receive one.116 Collectively, we take comfort in the ability of legislative
bodies to respond to those Charter decisions where the courts simply
"get it wrong."
. We also disagree that we assume a judicial monopoly on
interpretation. In our view, there is a distinction between what Brian
Slattery has called first-order duties (the duty of each branch of
government-legislative, executive, and judicial-to respect the values
enshrined in the Charter)117 and second-order duties (the duty of one or
more branches of government to review the acts of the other branches
to ensure that those branches are complying with their first-order
114 This is the conclusion of Alexander Bickel. See Alexander M. Bickel, The Least
Dangerous Branclz. The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics, 2d ed. (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1986).
" Indeed, many of the decisions that led to legislative sequels were vigorously criticized as
wrongly decided by one author. See Hogg, ConstitutionalLaw, supra note 31.
"
6 Hogg & Thornton, "Reply to 'Six Degrees of Dialogue,"' supra note 18 at 535.
'Section 32 of the Chartermakes it clear that the Charter applies "to the Parliament and
government of Canada" and "to the legislature and government of each province."
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duties)."' 8 In carrying out their first-order duties to respect the values
enshrined in the Charter, the legislative and executive branches of
government will necessarily interpret the Charter (and judicial decisions
interpreting the Charter)."9 The key issue, in our view, is not whether
the legislative and executive branches do, and should, interpret the
Charter (they do and should), but whether they should act on an
interpretation of the Charter that conflicts with an interpretation
provided by the courts. 2 In our view, where the interpretive task does
not take place against the backdrop of a prior relevant judicial decision,
the legislature and the executive may act on their interpretation of the
Charter. Why? Because, in doing so, they would not be doing (or
refraining from doing) something that the courts have said would
unjustifiably infringe the Charter. It would be strange indeed if "the
legislative or executive branches could not interpret the Charter and act
on that interpretation, where a court has not yet considered what the
Charter prohibits (or requires) in the circumstances.1 ' However, where
the interpretive task takes place against the backdrop of a prior relevant
judicial decision, the legislature and the executive may not act on an
interpretation of the Charter which conflicts with an interpretation
provided by the courts. Why? Because, in doing so, they would be doing
(or refraining from doing) something that the courts have said would
unjustifiably infringe the Charter, and under our system of
constitutional democracy, that is impermissible.
"18 Brian Slattery, "A Theory of the Charter" (1987) 25 Osgoode Hall L.J. 701.
"I In the federal jurisdiction, there is a continuing statutory obligation on the Minister of
Justice to review all proposed statutes and regulations for compliance with the Charter, and to
report instances of non-compliance to the House of Commons. See Department of Justice Act,
R.S.C. 1985, c. J-2, s. 4.1. In fulfilling this obligation, the Minister of Justice (or, more likely, his or
her staff) will necessarily interpret the Charter.
It is quite another issue, however, whether the other branches are actually eager to
develop and to take responsibility for their own novel interpretations of the Charter. On this point,
see Roach, "Dialogic Judicial Review," supra note 105 at 91-92.
12 The flip side of this issue is whether the courts should seek to restrain the legislature or
executive if it acts on an interpretation of a Charter right or freedom that conflicts with the courts'
interpretation.
121 Indeed, after the adoption of the Charter, all Canadian jurisdictions except for Quebec
(which was protesting the adoption of the Charter) engaged in a review of their statute books and
enacted amendments to a large number of statutes to correct perceived violations of Charterrights.
See e.g. Statute Law (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms) Amendment Act, S.C. 1985, c. 26.
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There are two exceptions to this idea. First, the legislative and
executive branches may act on a conflicting interpretation of the
Charter where, due to a material change in circumstances or the
discovery of new evidence, they are convinced that a measure that did
not constitute a justifiable limit on a Charter right at the time the
judicial decision was issued now constitutes a justifiable limit on a
Charter right. We admit this exception because, in our view, a court
should always be willing to revisit a previous decision that a particular
legislative or executive act or omission unjustifiably violated a Charter
right, on the basis that the act or omission may now be justified due to a
change in circumstances or new evidence which was not previously
considered by the court. We caution, however, that this exception must
not be reduced to a rule that "if at first you don't succeed, try, try
again."' 22 There must actually be a material change in circumstances or
new evidence that justifies reconsideration by the courts of the original
decision.
Second, the legislative branch may act on a conflicting
interpretation of the Charter by invoking the notwithstanding clause."2
We admit this exception because it is constitutionally enshrined. In
addition, as past practice has shown, the notwithstanding clause will be
used only rarely; when it is used, it remains in force for only five years,
at which time it must be re-enacted or left to expire. Furthermore, its
use does not extinguish the judicial interpretation of the Charter, which
is likely to play a role in the legislature's determination as to whether or
not to renew the notwithstanding clause at the end of its five-year
term. 24 The use of the notwithstanding clause to override a judicial
interpretation of the Charter is, admittedly, difficult to reconcile with
the wording of the override. As Jeremy Waldron points out, section 33,
by its own terms, requires legislatures to legislate "notwithstanding a
'2Sauv4 supra note 9 at 538, per McLachlin C.J.C.
' This view is shared by Peter H. Russell and Kent Roach. See Peter H. Russell, "Standing
Up for Notwithstanding" (1991) 29 Alta. L. Rev. 293 at 298-99; Roach, The Supreme Court on
Trial, supra note 110 at 243, 277-82.
24 In those cases where the iotwithstanding clause is available, it is perhaps correct to
suggest that we assume a judicial monopoly on penultimate (not final) interpretation of the
Charter. However, because the notwithstanding clause operates for only five years, the clause does
not override a judicial interpretation permanently, and thus it seems inappropriate to suggest that
the legislative interpretation is final. The notion of penultimate authority to interpret the Charter is
discussed in Michael J. Perry, "Protecting Human Rights in a Democracy: What Role for the
Courts?" (2003) 38 Wake Forest L. Rev. 635 at 673-78.
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provision included in section 2 or sections 7 to 15 of this Charter,"
rather than notwithstanding a judicial decision interpreting a Charter
right or freedom. According to Waldron, in so doing, it requires
legislatures to misrepresent their position, by requiring legislatures to
express "rights-misgivings" (misgivings about Charter rights and
freedoms), when what they will usually have are "rights-disagreements"
(disagreements about the interpretation of a particular Charter right or
freedom).15 Waldron makes a fair point that it might have been better if
section 33 had been worded differently.26 However, we do not think that
Waldron's critique is fatal. In our view, when the override is used, it is
likely that the public will realize that the legislature is, in fact, overriding
a judicial interpretation of a particular Charter right or freedom, rather
than the actual Charter right or freedom itself.1 27 If there is still a
concern that it will appear that the legislature is overriding a particular
Charter right or freedom, it can always clarify, in a legislative preamble,
that it affirms the Charter right or freedom in question, but is overriding
a judicial interpretation of that right or freedom.
In our view, the limited interpretive role for the legislative and
executive branches of government that we describe above is fully
justified in our system of government. It would be inconsistent with our
traditional institutional arrangements to give either the legislative or
executive branch final authority to interpret the Charter. Since
Confederation, the task of offering a final and binding interpretation of
the constitution has fallen to the courts. Before 1982, this task was (for
the most part)"2 confined to interpreting the distribution of legislative
's Jeremy Waldron, "Some Models of Dialogue Between Judges and Legislators" (2004)
23 Supreme Court L.R. (2d) 7, 34-39.
126 See the proposals for reform made by Goldsworthy, supra note 107 at 468; Manfredi,
Judicial Power, supra note 25 at 192-94; and M. Tushnet, "New Forms of Judicial Review and the
Persistence of Rights- and Democracy-Based Worries" (2003) 38 Wake Forest L. Rev. 813 at 819-
20 [Tushnet, "New Forms of Judicial Review"].
127Roach, "Dialogic Judicial Review," supra note 105 at 61.
128 The task was not confined exclusively to division of powers matters. Prior to 1982, the
courts enforced other non-division of powers restrictions on legislative power: e.g. Constitution Act,
1867, section 93 (guaranteeing rights and privileges of denominational schools), sections 96-100
(relating to the judiciary and guaranteeing, e.g. the tenure of superior court judges), section 125
(intergovernmental taxation), section 133 (guaranteeing the English. and French languages in
legislative and judicial proceedings in Quebec and the federal jurisdiction). There are many judicial
decisions striking down laws for breach of each of these provisions. In addition, for a time, the
Supreme Court of Canada also enforced an "implied bill of rights": see Reference re Alberta
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powers between the federal Parliament and the provincial legislatures."19
In 1982, this task was expanded to include the interpretation of the
Charter. It would be inconsistent with over 150 years of institutional
practice to "take the constitution away from the courts" by giving the
legislative or executive branches final authority to interpret the Charter.
It would also be inconsistent with the structure of the Charter to
give final authority over its interpretation to either the legislative or
executive branch. If Parliament or the legislature could override a
court's interpretation of the Charter by simply enacting ordinary
legislation reflecting a different interpretation, without the need for the
public signal of invoking the notwithstanding clause and without the
five-year limit on the new law, section 33 of the Charter would be
redundant. With its careful regulation of the override power, section 33
contemplates that judicial interpretation is authoritative-as does the
supremacy clause of the constitution (section 52).
The rule of law can also be invoked to support our traditional
arrangements that deny to the legislative or executive branches final
authority to interpret the Charter.13 The rule of law requires that
government be bound by law. 31 If either the legislative or executive
branch was given final authority to interpret the Charter, it is difficult to
see how it could be said that the government (meaning the legislative
and executive branches) was bound by or subject to the Charter. Charter
provisions that posed a challenge to particular government goals could
simply be "interpreted" so as not to apply. Without an independent
arbiter, such as the judiciary, charged with the task of providing a final
Legislation, [1938] S.C.R. 100; Saumur v. City of Quebec, [1953] 2 S.C.R. 299; Switzman v. Elbling,
[1957] S.C.R. 285.
129 Before 1982, if a statute was inconsistent with the British North America Act
(reproduced in R.S.C. 1985, Appendix II, No. 5, as the Constitution Act, 1867(U.K.)) [B.N.A. Ac],
then the B.N.A. Act had to prevail because it was an imperial statute. Imperial statutes extending to
Canada had overriding force because the Colonial Laws Validity Act, 28 & 29 Vict. c. 63 (U.K.)
provided that colonial legislation repugnant to an imperial statute extending to the colony was
invalid. Since 1982, the doctrine of repugnancy defined by the Colonial Laws Validity Act has been
replaced by the supremacy clause in section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.
'-3 The rule of law figures prominently in the Charter. The preamble to the Charter
provides that "Canada is founded upon principles that recognize ... the rule of law." in addition,
section 1 of the Charter requires that any "reasonable limits" on a Charter right or freedom be
"prescribed by law."
31 See Peter W. Hogg & Cara F. Zwibel, "The Rule of Law in the Supreme Court of
Canada" (2005) 55 U.T.L.J. 715 at 718.
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and binding interpretation of the Charter, there is a real danger that "all
the reservations of particular rights or privileges would amount to
nothing."'32 An important role of the rule of law is to protect minorities
and civil liberties generally. That role would be jeopardized if the
legislative or executive branch, which is responsible for enacting and
implementing the laws, was also given final authority to interpret the
scope of the constitutional restrictions on those responsibilities.
We should make clear that our support for the traditional role of
the courts as the authoritative interpreters of the constitution should not
be taken to suggest that the courts are more important or useful or
progressive institutions than the legislative and executive branches. In a
democracy, that would be a ridiculous position. Important change
inevitably comes primarily from the legislative and executive branches of
government, not from the courts. The courts have very limited power to
cause social change. They are not accountable to public opinion (and
have no way of canvassing it anyway); they have no power to order
independent research or to hold public hearings on policy issues; they
have no power to create many of the policy instruments that legislatures
routinely use; they have no access to public funds; and, they have no
capacity to administer programs. Unemployment insurance, workers'
compensation, old age pensions, social assistance, food and drug
standards, labour standards, public health care, public education and
human rights codes are among the progressive measures initiated and
implemented by the legislative and executive branches of government.
But the generally benign and progressive influence of the
legislative and executive branches does not mean that they should be
freed from all constitutional constraints. The interests of minorities and
other human rights values will inevitably from time to time be
overlooked by bodies that respond to majoritarian pressures. Judicial
review under the Charter is the protection for those occasions, and we
can see the protection at work in the cases that deal with abortion, gay
and lesbian rights, Aboriginal rights, and the due process rights of
persons accused of crime, to name obvious examples. The theoretical
possibility that a Charter decision could jeopardize a progressive
legislative programme, as occurred in the United States during the
Lochner era from 1905 to 1937, is answered by our 1997 article. In
132 James Madison, Alexander Hamilton & John Jay, The Federalist Papers, ed. by Isaac
Kramnick (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1987), No. 78 at 438 (Alexander Hamilton).
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Canada, unlike the United States, Charter decisions normally leave
room for a legislative response and normally receive a legislative
response-one that accomplishes the main policy objectives of the law
that was struck down.
An argument from tradition cannot by itself justify the
continuance of a practice. However, we say that, in light of the long
history, in this country and elsewhere, of judicial finality in interpreting
the constitution, the burden of justifying a departure falls properly on
the advocates of "taking the constitution away from the courts." They
ought to demonstrate why the judiciary should no longer have final
authority to interpret the Charter, which branch (legislative or
executive) should have final authority to interpret the Charter,'33 and
how human rights are to be protected in that unfamiliar new world.' 34
These issues are not addressed, often not at all and never
comprehensively, in the work of the Canadian critics.
C. Discounting the Impact of Judicial Review Under the Charter
The third major line of criticism is that dialogue improperly
discounts the extent to which judicial decision making under the Charter
drives policy making in Canada. There are several variants of this line of
criticism, which we will consider in turn below.
133 There appear to be two general versions of the idea of coordinate construction. The first
version of the idea of coordinate construction is "departmentalism." Under this version of
coordinate construction, each governmental official might follow his or her own interpretation, or
each governmental branch might follow its own interpretation, with the Prime Minister's
interpretation binding all other executive branch officials, the Supreme Court's interpretation
binding the rest of the judiciary, and Parliament's and the provincial legislature's interpretation
binding on all MPs and MPPs (or MLPs) respectively. The second variant of the idea of coordinate
construction is "legislative finality." Under this version of coordinate construction, where the
constitution is not completely clear, so that its interpretation is at issue and controverted, its
interpretation should be settled for all government branches (not just one branch) by the legislative
branch of government. It appears that the Canadian critics are drawn to some permutation of the
second version-legislative finality.
4 Mark Tushnet has been developing a body of work on how best to develop non-judicial
forums for constitutional decision making, with a focus on the United States. See Tushnet, Taking
the Constitution Away, supra note 110; Tushnet, "Non-Judicial Review," supra note 110. Janet L.
Hiebert has started the task for Canada. See Janet L. Hiebert, "A Relational Approach to
Constitutional Interpretation: Shared Legislative and Judicial Responsibilities" (2001) 35 J. Cdn.
Studies 161; Janet L. Hiebert, "Wrestling with Rights: Judges, Parliament and the Making of Social
Policy" IRPP Choices 5:3 (June 1999) 1; and Janet L. Hiebert, "Is it Too Late to Rehabilitate
Canada's Notwithstanding Clause?" (2004) 23 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 169.
Charter Dialogue Revisited
1. Policy Distortion
Manfredi and Kelly say that "Charter Dialogue" does not
answer the anti-majoritarian objection to judicial review because "policy
distortion" occurs "whenever a legislature must subordinate its
understanding of constitutionally permissible policy to that articulated
by a court." 135 We agree that even a weak form of judicial review
involves a considerable judicial influence on the legislative process. But
it is surely an extreme position that any influence by the courts on
legislation is illegitimate. For example, the courts have required that
search warrants be required for police searches; that "reverse onus"
clauses be eliminated from criminal statutes; that mens rea be an
element of serious criminal offences; that meaningful standards be
prescribed for the censorship of movies; that absentee voting be
provided for; and that limited forms of advertising be permitted to
professionals. These examples, taken more or less. at random from our
schedule of cases in "Charter Dialogue," do not involve the defeat of
any major democratic objective. What they require is that, in
implementing their objectives, legislators pay more attention to the
liberty of the individual and show more respect for minorities than they
are likely to do in the absence of judicial review. Rather than defeating a
desired legislative policy, the Charter decisions of Canadian courts
usually operate at the margins of legislative policy, affecting issues of
process, enforcement, and standards, all of which can accommodate
most legislative objectives.
Policy distortion is, at least in theory, more of a concern where a
court rules that the objective of a particular government policy is
inconsistent with the Charter. The Supreme Court of Canada's
conclusion that legislated imposition of the Christian Sabbath violated
the Charter is one of the few examples.136 Another example is Vriend v.
Alberta,137 discussed in Part IIA, above. In Vriend, the Supreme Court
of Canada required that sexual orientation be added to the prohibited
I Manfredi & Kelly, "Six Degrees of Dialogue," supra note 17 at 522.
'
36 R. v. Big MDrug Mart, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 (striking down the federal Lord's Day Act).
But even here, dialogue occurred, and the objective of providing Sunday as a common pause day
for workers was achieved. A provincial law providing for Sunday closing of retail stores was upheld
on the basis that the law had the secular objective of a day of rest, and limited freedom of religion
as little as reasonably possible. R. v. Edwards Books andArt Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713.
'
3
' Supra note 9.
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grounds of discrimination in Alberta's human rights legislation. The
Alberta legislature had put its collective mind to this issue, debated it,
and decided not to include sexual orientation in the grounds of
discrimination. The Court here was going against a deliberate policy of
the legislature by reading in the unwanted phrase. But Vriend is an
unusual case, because, as we showed in "Charter Dialogue,"' 38 and as
other scholars have concluded,139 Charter decisions rarely defeat a major
legislative policy. In addition, the case illustrates an important role for
judicial review. As we noted above, popular legislative assemblies are
not always disposed to protect the rights of an unpopular minority.
Judicial review can make up for that deficiency in majoritarian decision
making. However, even in Vriend, the Court did not have to have the
last word. The Alberta legislature could have overturned the decision by
the use of the notwithstanding clause. The government of Alberta
considered that course of action, and, in the end, decided not to propose
it. Because the decision was not followed by a legislative sequel, we have
not counted it as a case of dialogue, but the dialogue-related point is
that the legislature could have had the last word if the political will to
restore the old law had been stronger.
2. A Judicial Change in the Status Quo
F.L. Morton and Rainer Knopff, in their book on judicial
review,14 are highly critical of the Court's Charter decisions, and regard
the Court as unduly influenced by a "Court party" of intellectuals and
' There is room for interpretation obviously, but very few of the sixty-six decisions
described could plausibly be treated as defeating the legislative policy. Two cases that might have
had that effect, namely, Ford v. Ouebec, supra note 4 (language of signs) and R. v. Daviault, supra
note 5 (common law defence of drunkenness), were simply reversed in the sequel legislation using
section 33 (in the case of Ford) and section 1 (in the case of Daviault).
139 One study of Supreme Court of Canada decisions found that the Court accepted that
the legislative objective was sufficiently important to justify the limitation of a Charter right in 97
per cent of cases. See Leon E. Trakman, William Cole-Hamilton and Sean Gatien, "R. v. Oakes
1986-1997: Back to the Drawing Board" (1998) 36 Osgoode Hall L.J. 83. In several recent cases, the
courts have expressed some serious reservations about the government's objectives, but have
accepted the objectives and gone on to consider whether the limitation satisfied the remaining
branches of the Oakes test: Sauv4, supra note 9 (denial of voting rights to prisoners to enhance civic
responsibility, promote the rule of law, and punish prisoners); Halpern v. Canada(2003), 65 O.R.
(3d) 161 (C.A.) (denial of marriage to gays and lesbians to unite the opposite sexes, promote
procreation, and encourage companionship).
4 Supra note 16. See also Morton, "Dialogue or Monologue?," supra note 17 at 24-26.
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interest groups promoting left-wing causes. This influence, they argue,
leads to unpopular decisions that could not survive the public scrutiny
that is characteristic of democratic decision making. As explained earlier
in this article, the idea of a dialogue between courts and legislatures is a
serious challenge to this thesis-just as it is to the thesis that the courts
make politically conservative decisions that would not be countenanced
by popular assemblies. If unpopular judicial decisions can be modified
or overturned by the competent legislative body, it becomes much less
significant whether the decisions have been achieved through the efforts
of the Court party, or for whatever other reason the decisions have been
made in disregard of popular sentiment. Morton and Knopff do not
ignore this problem. They acknowledge that the dialogue theory is
"undoubtedly true in the abstract," but they say that it is "too
simplistic" '141 because it "fails to recognize the staying power of a new,
judicially created policy status quo."'42
There is some force to Morton and Knopff's point about the
staying power of this new status quo. However, we question whether it is
a bad thing that some judicial decisions striking down legislation for
unjustifiably infringing a Charter right or freedom bring about a form of
legislative inertia that hinders the ability of legislatures to respond.
Morton and Knopff use Vriend to illustrate their point. According to
them, the judicial ruling that sexual orientation had to be protected
under Alberta's human rights legislation "raised the political costs of
saying 'no' to the winning minority," and the government concluded that
"the safest thing was to do nothing."'43 This is without a doubt an
accurate analysis of what happened after Vriend. But what does this
example show? It shows that the public respects judicial interpretation
of the Charter, making it politically difficult to reverse a decision of the
Court on a Charter issue (particularly a divisive Charter issue). As one
of the authors has commented elsewhere, is that not as it should be?'" If
there had been more public support for the withdrawal of the rights
upheld in Vriend, the reversal of the decision would have been
politically feasible. At bottom, legislative inertia is caused by the fact
'4'Morton & Knopff, ibid. at 162.
142 Ibid.
t43 Ibid. at 165.
"4Hogg, "The Charter Revolution," supra note 18 at 6.
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that public opinion is generally supportive of the Charter and of judicial
review, even in polls taken after unpopular decisions. That is one reason
why the relationship between judicial review and democracy is much
more complicated than the straightforward contradiction sometimes
assumed by Charter critics. In any case, the fact that a decision like
Vriendis legally reversible by use of the notwithstanding clause remains
very important, since it is a safeguard against a decision that is truly
unacceptable. The existence of this legal power-however rarely it may
be exercised-forces politicians to take responsibility for their decisions
(including decisions to do nothing) and avoids the extreme forms of
court-packing and court-bashing that occur in the United States.
Two notable occasions on which judicial decisions have been
reversed illustrate this point and show that where majoritarian will is
sufficient, a legislature 'can overcome the inertia of which Morton and
Knopff complain. On the first occasion, the National Assembly of
Quebec (using section 33) reversed the Ford decision and restored its
French-only law for commercial signs.145 On the second occasion, the
Parliament of Canada (using section 1) reversed the Daviault decision
and restored the rule that drunkenness is no defence to criminal
offences of general intent.'46 Given those examples, the decision of the
government of Alberta not to attempt to reverse the Vriend decision
can be seen as based on a (likely correct) assessment by the Premier of
Alberta that popular support was lacking for such a move.1 47 The fact
that the move was legally possible and was seriously examined by the
government means that the absence of any legislative sequel to Vriend
could just as easily be regarded as a considered response to the decision
as it could be seen as an example that contradicts the dialogue idea.
A second response to the Morton and Knopff critique is that
most decisions do not bring about the legislative inertia of which they
complain. Vriend, Ford and Daviault are not typical cases. In most
Charter cases, there is no political impulse to reverse the judicial
'
4 Supra note 4.
146 Supra note 5.
"s And, as Goldsworthy reminds us, "surely that is the electorate's democratic
prerogative." See Goldsworthy, supra note 107 at 456. It would not be open to those (like Waldron)
to suggest that "an ingenuous electorate is likely to be deceived by ... a naive faith in judges' expert
legal skills, superior wisdom, and impartiality," because "[t]hat objection would reflect precisely the
same lack of faith in the electorate's capacity for enlightened self-government that motivates
proponents of constitutionally entrenched rights" (ibid. at 456-57).
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decision. Usually, the attitude of the government whose law was struck
down is not one of hostility to the Court's civil libertarian concern;
rather, the issue for the government is to craft a new law that
accommodates the Court's concerns while preserving the legislative
objective. This is demonstrated by the legislative sequels reported in our
1997 article: inertia did not prevent forty-six new laws from being
enacted after sixty-six decisions struck down laws on Charter grounds.
One example is provided by the Parliament of Canada's reaction to a
series of decisions by the Supreme Court of Canada that ruled that
surreptitious electronic surveillance by police informers wearing body
packs or using hidden cameras was an unconstitutional search and
seizure under section 8 of the Charter.48 Parliament promptly amended
the Criminal Code, by providing for the issue of a warrant to authorize
various forms of electronic surveillance, and providing for measures to
be taken without warrant in situations of emergency or danger to the
police officer. 4 9 Inertia was not an issue. Indeed, the government
recognized that the field of electronic surveillance was in need of more
regulation, and moved quickly to provide it.
Our view that most judicial decisions striking down legislation
for unjustifiably infringing a Charter right probably do not bring about
legislative inertia is reinforced by the nature of parliamentary
government in Canada. In Canada, power is concentrated in the federal
and provincial cabinets and (increasingly) the Prime Minister and the
provincial premiers. This concentration of power, coupled with strict
party discipline, means that Canadian governments usually get their own
way, even when their agenda includes controversial issues.15
'48 R. v. Duarte, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 30; R. v. Wiggins, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 62; and R. v. Wong,
[1990] 3 S.C.R. 36. One of the authors has written critically of these decisions. See Hogg,
Constitutional Law, supra note 31, c. 45.5(b).
'
49 S.C. 1993, c. 40, adding section 487.01 to the Criminal Code.
150 The recent Parliamentary debate about same-sex marriage demonstrates the point.
Prime Minister Paul Martin required all cabinet ministers to vote for the government's legislation
extending legal marriage to same-sex couples. See Civil Marriage Act, supra note 29. To be sure,
this decision was highly criticized, and some might argue that it came at a political cost, but the
point is that the government of Canada was able to pass legislation dealing with a deeply divisive
social issue, in part by disciplining part of the Liberal government to vote for the legislation.
This can be contrasted with the Parliamentary debate following the Court's decision in R.
v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, which struck down the therapeutic abortion provisions of the
Criminal Code on the ground that they unjustifiably infringed section 7 of the Charter. The
government of Canada introduced a new bill to re-criminalize abortion, but with less onerous
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Interestingly, Morton and Knopff concede that legislatures often fail to
respond to Charter decisions because they concern moral questions that
are "not a priority for the government, the opposition parties, or the
majority of voters,. 51 and that "[w]hen the policy is central to the
government's program, the government should have little difficulty
mustering the political will to respond effectively."' 52
We conclude that, after a court decision striking down a law on
Charter grounds, the "staying power" of the "new, judicially created
policy status quo" is not usually very strong at all, and where the staying
power is strong, this is not necessarily a bad thing.
3. Placing Issues on the Legislative Agenda
Morton and Knopff also suggest that the notion of dialogue
improperly discounts the ability that judges have to place issues on (or
set) the legislative agenda.153 It is certainly true that Charter decisions
often end up on the legislative agenda. In a sense, we proved that very
point in our 1997 article when we showed that Charter decisions usually
lead to a legislative response. To make a fine distinction, however, it
should be noted that it is not really the judges that have chosen the issue
that makes its way on to the legislative agenda. Rather, that choice is
made long before the Supreme Court of Canada ever renders a
decision, by the individual claimant who alleges that his or her Charter
rights are being unjustifiably infringed. If, and only if, the claimant
convinces the court that his or her complaint is valid and that a statute
or other enactment should be overturned will the government have to
consider its options.
requirements for legal therapeutic abortions. Anticipating the political costs of imposing party
discipline, at a crucial point in the vote the government decided to allow a free vote. The new bill
was eventually passed by the House of Commons and then defeated in the Senate in a tie vote.
Tushnet suggests another hidden cost: a government may survey the political terrain and
decide "that it would lose more on other important issues if it imposed party discipline to override
the courts." See Tushnet, "New Forms of Judicial Review," supra note 126 at 834. We say, in
response, that if this is true, the government can still get its way, provided it is willing to suffer the
outside cost.
'1s Supra note 16 at 164.
'52 Ibid. at 165.
' Ibid. at 157.
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When a new law is one of those options (which is the typical
case), the litigation does have the effect of placing an issue on the
legislative agenda that the government would not have chosen of its own
accord. Is this a bad thing? Surely democracy is served, not hampered,
by forcing the discussion of controversial issues that otherwise might be
neglected, particularly where those issues raise concerns about civil
liberties. As Roach notes, "Charter decisions can be seen in a mature
democracy as a means to manufacture disagreement and to turn
complacent majoritarian monologues into democratic and, at times,
divisive dialogues."'54 Charter values, which often include the concerns
of an aggrieved minority, have their place in democratic debate.
D. Dialogue-"Much Ado About Metaphors"
Several critics make much of the definition of "dialogue" used in
Charter Dialogue." As noted in Part I, above, this is one of the reasons
why we subtitled this article "Much Ado About Metaphors."
Seizing on the semantics, Manfredi and Kelly claim that
"Charter Dialogue" adopts a "shifting" definition of dialogue.'55 They
suggest that the study begins with "a relatively rigorous definition of
dialogue as legislative action that reverses, modifies, or avoids judicial
decisions," but then "quickly expands to encompass 'some action by the
competent legislative body."'156 Our response is this: Manfredi and Kelly
appear to have misread our suggestion that the possibility for dialogue
exists when legislatures can (meaning, have the option to) reverse,
modify, or avoid a judicial decision, by concluding that we meant that
dialogue can only occur when legislatures reverse, modify, or avoid a
judicial decision. In our view, dialogue occurs where a judicial decision
striking down a piece of legislation for inconsistency with a Charter right
or freedom is followed by some action by the competent legislative
body. This is the definition that we set out in the section of "Charter
Dialogue" labelled "Our Definition of Dialogue.' ' 51
Morton claims that the definition of dialogue adopted in
"CharterDialogue" is "self-serving," and suggests that it is "[n]o wonder
"' Roach, "Dialogic Judicial Review," supra note 105 at 75 [footnote omitted].
''
5 Manfredi & Kelly, "Dialogue, Deference and Restraint," supra note 17 at 330.
'56 Ibid. at 330-31.
"s Supra note 1 at 81-82.
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[we] found a two-thirds incidence of dialogue!' ' 18 Manfredi suggests that
true dialogue involves reversing, modifying, or avoiding a judicial
decision. He then proceeds to suggest that dialogue rarely ever happens
because judicial decisions are rarely reversed, modified, or avoided.
(For Manfredi, decisions are reversed when there is legislative rejection
of a decision's fundamental constitutional holding; modified when
legislatures accept a decision's fundamental constitutional holding, but
reject all or part of the decision's section 1 analysis; and avoided when
legislatures leave the pre-decision status quo unchanged or produce a
new status quo that differs significantly from the one approved by the
court.)159 Our response is this: reasonable people can (and obviously do)
disagree about what type of legislative response is required to count as
"dialogue." We have defended our definition of dialogue elsewhere, and
we feel that it would serve little purpose to repeat ourselves here."6
However, like Roach, we feel that much could be learned from case
studies examining "the conditions under which legislatures have
successfully revised or rejected court decisions and the conditions under
which they have failed to do so ... ."16' Such studies would be very likely
to affirm the thesis of our article by showing that Charter decisions are
carefully reviewed within government and consideration is given to a
variety of legislative or executive responses that do not involve
abandoning the policy that the court struck down. Anecdotally, we know
that this is so. However, we expect that Charter skeptics on the right will
continue to be troubled by the influence on government policy of the
Court's "progressive" decisions, and Charter skeptics on the left will
continue to be troubled by the influence of the Court's "conservative"
decisions on government policy. In short, we expect the dialogue about
"dialogue" to continue.
E. Dialogue in the Supreme Court
The fourth major criticism, which has been heard increasingly of
late, is that the notion of dialogue is flawed because it can be used both
'58 Morton, "Dialogue or Monologue?" supra note 17 at 23.
"" Christopher P. Manfredi, "The Life of a Metaphor: Dialogue in the Supreme Court,
1998-2003" (2004) 23 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 105 at 122-29 [Manfredi, "The Life of a Metaphor"].
"mHogg & Thornton, "Reply to Six Degrees of Dialogue," supra note 18.
"6 Roach, "Dialogic Judicial Review," supra note 105 at 76.
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to support a deferential approach to Parliament and the provincial
legislatures and to defend decisions striking down legislation. 162
We agree that the notion of dialogue has been referred to by the
Court to a variety of different ends. 63 The decisions of the Court in the
second look cases, described in Part IID, above, demonstrate the point.
In some cases, dialogue has been invoked in deciding that the judiciary
ought to give some deference to the legislature's reconciliation of
conflicting rights and social interests following a Charter decision."6 In
other cases, dialogue has been treated as providing no meaningful
guidance to the exercise of the judicial function.1 65
However, we think it goes too far to suggest that the notion of
dialogue, as we understand it, is flawed simply because it has been used
by the Court to explain or justify both deferential and non-deferential
approaches to second look cases and the court's remedial discretion. In
our 1997 article, it never occurred to us that the phenomenon we
described (legislative action following a Charter decision) had any
normative force at all, or any relevance to the judicial decision-making
process. Indeed, the manner in which judges have used the term is not
always consistent with our definition of the concept, which makes this
hardly a fair critique of the article itself.
To address the Court's use of the concept (which, as noted, is
not always the same as we conceived it ourselves), we do not agree that
"dialogue" militates either for or against deference. In a "first look"
case, it is hard to see how the prospect of a subsequent legislative
response would weigh for or against upholding the legislation. The
prospect of a subsequent legislative response is not one of the
considerations that a court should take into account in ruling whether or
not a law is valid. (Yet, as we have acknowledged above, we now see that
the prospect of a subsequent legislative respdnse may properly be
considered by a court in devising the appropriate remedy for an invalid
law). We believe that courts should not approach second look cases any
162 Cameron, "Dialogue and Hierarchy," supra note 15 at 1063. See also Manfredi, "The
Life of a Metaphor," supra note 159.
6 Roach, "Dialogic Judicial Review," supra note 105 at 50.
• Justice McLachlin, as she then was, and Justice lacobucci, for the majority, in Mill,
Chief Justice McLachlin, for the majority, in Hall; Justice Gonthier, dissenting, in Sauv6
" Justice Iacobucci, dissenting, in Hall; Chief Justice McLachlin, for the majority, in
Sauv
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differently than they approach first look cases. In an earlier work, one of
the authors suggested that "[t]he theory of dialogue, if applied to the
courts, would suggest that the Court should give increased deference to
the legislation in that situation, and should normally uphold the 'second
try."'166 The thinking was that increased deference would be appropriate
in second look cases because the new law would have been precipitated
by the Court's earlier decision, and would have been drafted in light of
the Court's reasons in that decision. But, on further reflection, it cannot
be right that increased deference is appropriate solely because the case
is a second look case. In the second look case, as in the first look case,
the task of determining whether a Charter right or freedom has been
unjustifiably infringed falls properly to the courts.
With this said, it is perfectly appropriate that the court, in its
analysis of a second look case, should explicitly acknowledge in its
reasons the fact that the legislature has engaged in "dialogue" following
the initial decision. While all new laws are vetted for constitutionality by
lawyers in the employ of the Crown, in a second look case there will
inevitably have been a particularly focused assessment of the means
chosen to accomplish a legislative objective in light of the court's
decision that a prior enactment failed to give due consideration to the
Charter. Accordingly, what may appear to be "judicial deference" by the
court in a second look case may be merely an appropriate
acknowledgement of the process in which the legislature has explicitly
engaged, including assessment of complex social science evidence,
consideration of the interests of competing groups, or allocation of
scarce resources.167 In a second look case, these considerations are not
merely an ex post facto justification by legal counsel of a law that may
actually have been driven by other considerations. Rather, the
consideration of the least restrictive means of accomplishing the
legislative objective will have been informed by the previous decision.
The legislature's objectives and their social importance may well be
recited in the preamble to the second law. The terms of the second law
will almost certainly represent the legislature's actual efforts to achieve
its policy objective in a manner that respects the Charter values
identified in the previous decision. That is not to say that the courts
" Peter W. Hogg, "Discovering Dialogue" (2004) 23 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 3 at 5.
16 7
1l Iin Toy v. Quebec, [19891 1 S.C.R. 927 at 993-94.
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should automatically defer to legislative policy chbices; on the contrary,
the government must not be relieved of its burden of proving that rights
infringements are justified.'68 The mere fact of legislative deliberation
does not carry a law over the section 1 barrier. However, in a second
look case, the dialogic process that followed the previous decision is
likely to yield a particularly strong case for section 1 justification.
Janet Hiebert has suggested that it is appropriate to
"differentiate between the rights-oriented dimension of defining
normative values in the Charter and the more policy-laden task of
assessing the reasonableness of complex policy objectives" to reflect the
respective expertise of courts and legislatures.'69 We do not take the
idea as far as Hiebert, as we believe that the ultimate "reasonable
limits" determination must be made by the courts. Yet, we agree that
some degree of deference should be accorded to legislatures on section
1 matters because "[w]hen it comes to determining the best way to
pursue legislative objectives that are considered important enough to
restrict rights ... representative institutions have distinct advantages in
their access to extensive resources and the policy expertise necessary for
prudent and responsible policy decisions."'7 ° This distinction is valid in
all Charter cases, but it has particular force in second look cases.
However, if the second law has been enacted on the premise of a
legislative disagreement with the court's interpretation of a Charter
right or freedom (as opposed to a more convincing demonstration of
section 1 justification), then the second look case will have to be decided
against the legislation, unless a notwithstanding clause has been used.
This disagreement may take the shape of a second law that is more
restrictive of a Charter right or freedom than the court was prepared to
accept in the first look case. And, even when the issue in the second
look case is one of justification, the courts may, after according due
"'¢ The issue of deference is usually raised at the "least restrictive means" stage of the
section 1 justification analysis. Most laws are struck down for failure to satisfy the "least restrictive
means" requirement, and thus deference is particularly relevant at that stage of the analysis.
69 Hiebert argues that judges are best equipped to define rights because they are relatively
insulated from political pressures, and thus less restricted in identifying the circumstances in which
legislative goals unduly'restrict rights, and because defining rights is at the core of judicial decision
making since it is a task that judges regularly and deliberately perform. Hiebert argues that
legislatures are best equipped to make policy decisions because they have better access to
specialized expertise and relevant information and data. Janet Hiebert, Charter Conflicts- What Is
Parliament's Role?(Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002) at 51-54.
170 Ibid. at xiii.
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deference, still not be persuaded that the limitations on a Charter right
in the second law pass the Oakes test. In that case, of course, the second
look case will have to be decided against the legislation.
The mixed results in the majority of the second look cases that
we described above can be understood, in large part, as a disagreement
by individual judges about how due consideration of the complementary
but distinct roles of courts and legislatures affects the outcome of
individual cases. In Hall, the Court appeared to disagree, in large part,
about whether the statutory response respected the principles set down
by the Court in the first look decision. In Sauvd and Harper, the Court.
appeared to disagree, in large part, about whether the case should be
seen as an attempt to limit a right "fundamental to our democracy"' 171
(which would preclude deference) or the evaluation of "choices
regarding social or political philosophies" and "shaping, giving
expression, and giving practical application to values" '172 (which would
warrant deference). Some cases are more difficult to explain than
others, and even among the authors of this article, there are differences
of opinion on whether the courts have always used "dialogue" in an
appropriate manner. Mills may be the second look case in which the
Court's appeal to "dialogue" is most difficult to rationalize, and we
acknowledge a disagreement among ourselves on whether it can be
rationalized at all. 73 Nevertheless, even if one concludes that judicial
t Sauv supra note 9 at 535.
172 Ibid. at 576-77.
1 Another interesting example is Parliament's response to the Court's decision in R. v.
Daviault, supra note 5. In that case, counsel for Daviault, who had been convicted of sexual assault,
successfully argued that sections 7 and 11(d) of the Charter required that an accused person be
permitted to advance the defence that he was in a state of "drunkenness akin to automatism" and
lacked the requisite mens rea for the crime. Prior to Daviault, the common law rule had been that a
drunkenness defence was not open to a person accused of a "general intent" crime such as sexual
assault. The Court accepted Daviault's argument that extreme drunkenness was a defence and
granted him a new trial. Parliament responded with legislation providing that self-induced
intoxication would no longer be a defence to a criminal offence involving "an assault or any other
interference or threat of interference by a person with the bodily integrity of another person": S.C.
1995, c. 32, c. 1. What is remarkable about the post-Daviault legislation is that Parliament has
basically enacted without modification the very propositions of law that the Court rejected in the
Daviault case. However, the statute also includes a lengthy preamble offering justifications for the
new law, including the association between intoxication and violence against women and children.
Parliament's part in the dialogue on this issue reads like a rebuttal of the majority's position in
Daviault. The reply legislation has not yet been challenged, but if it were challenged, the courts
would have to determine whether a more convincing demonstration of section 1 justification had
been advanced; if not, the reply legislation would have to be struck down.
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notions of dialogue have occasionally deviated from our thesis, we still
maintain that the idea of dialogue, translated by the judges into explicit
consideration of the respective roles of the judicial and legislative
branches, has had a benign influence on the Court's jurisprudence.
IV. THE PRESENT STATE OF DIALOGUE
In this part, we provide an update of "the numbers" since the
article was published in 1997,' using the same criteria that we used in
the original article, with the exception that we have not included
consideration of any lower court decisions. t75 In "Charter Dialogue," we
found that there were 66 cases in which a law was held to be invalid for
breach of the Charter. Of those 66 cases, all but 13 elicited some
response from the competent legislative body. In seven cases, the
response was simply to repeal the offending law. In the remaining 46
cases (more than two-thirds of the total), a new law was substituted for
the old law. In two cases, the decisions were overruled and the new law
essentially re-enacted the law that had been held to be invalid: once
through the use of section 33 (Ford) and once through the use of
section 1 (Daviault).
Since the 1997 article, there have been 23 cases in which a law
was held to be invalid for breach of the Charter. Of those 23 cases, 14
(or approximately 61 per cent) elicited some response from the
competent legislative body. In one case, the response was simply to
repeal the offending law. In the remaining 13 cases, a new law was
substituted for the offending law. In no case did the legislative sequel
amount to the decision being overruled using either section 33 or
'
7 4 A couple of points of clarification about specific cases. First, in the case of Reference re
Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince Edward Island, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3, we
have counted the legislative responses to the decision as three separate responses, because the case
dealt with the laws of three separate provinces and was started as three separate proceedings, but
was later consolidated in a reference. Second, in the case of M v. H., supra note 9, we have counted
only the legislative response in Ontario and not the amendments that were enacted in virtually all
other provinces, because the decision directly addressed only the Ontario legislation. For an
account of some of the various other legislative responses to M v. H., see Jason Murphy, "Dialogic
Responses to M v. H.: From Compliance to Defiance" (2001) 59 U. T. Fac. L. Rev. 299.
'"- In "Charter Dialogue," we included some lower court decisions. Their inclusion was
defensible because they were all cases that had struck down laws and, unusually, had not been
appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada. However, we were criticized by Manfredi & Kelly, "Six
Degrees of Dialogue," supra note 17 at 516-17, for being too casual about our numbers, and there'
was some point to the criticism.
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section 1. These numbers are lower than those reported in "Charter
Dialogue," but most of the decisions since 1997 in which the Supreme
Court has struck down a law on Charter grounds have been followed by
a legislative response. Each decision left room for a legislative response,
and most decisions received a legislative response. Dialogue lives on!
The results are summarized in the table below, and, as in
"CharterDialogue," each case and its sequel are described in Appendix I.
In Appendix II, we have listed and described all of the second
look cases, whether decided before or after 1997, since we did not
perceive the importance of these cases in "Charter Dialogue," and thus
did not treat them as a separate category.
Table 1: Legislative Sequels Since "CharterDialogue"
LFed. BC AB SK MB ON PQ NB PEI NS NL Ter.
Mod.Bore 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0Before
Repeal 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mod. 4176 1 1 0 0 2 2177 1 1 1 0 0After
Used 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
s. 33
No 6178 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0Response
V. CONCLUSION
In this article, we have discussed the five ways in which the
judges of the Supreme Court of Canada have used the idea of dialogue.
First, some judges have invoked the idea of dialogue in seeking to justify
judicial review. Second, some judges have invoked the idea of dialogue
in opposing the reading down of legislation in a Charter case. Third,
some judges have invoked the idea of dialogue as a reason for
"76 Includes Corbiere, supra note 9, in which a new regulation was brought into force.
" Includes R. v. Guignard, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 472, which concerned the validity of a Quebec
municipal bylaw.
" Includes Benner v. Canada (Secretary of State), [1997] 1 S.C.R. 358, in which amending
legislation was introduced but died on the order paper.
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suspending declarations of invalidity in Charter cases. Fourth, some
judges have invoked the idea of dialogue in the context of a case
considering the exercise of remedial discretion under section 24 of the
Charter. And finally, some judges have invoked the idea of dialogue in
second look cases, at times as a reason for deferring to the legislative
judgment, and at other times to remind legislatures that the courts will
not automatically defer to the legislature simply because it has revised
and re-enacted an invalid law.
We have also discussed the four main lines of criticism of the
idea of dialogue, as we understand them. The first line of criticism is
that "Charter Dialogue" fails to justify judicial review under the
Charter. We agree, but we add that dialogue demonstrates that we have
a weak form of judicial review in Canada, which makes judicial review
easier to overcome and therefore easier to justify. The second line of
criticism is that dialogue does not, and cannot, exist where final
authority to interpret the Charter is vested in the courts. We counter
that most Charter decisions, even though they are the final word on the
meaning of the Charter, leave room for a range of legislative responses
and generally receive a legislative response. The third line of criticism is
that dialogue improperly discounts the extent to which judicial decision
making under the Charter distorts policy, creates a new, judicially
created status quo, and gives the courts the significant power to place
issues on the legislative agenda. We agree that even a weak form of
judicial review involves considerable judicial influence on the legislative
process, but we point out that it rarely defeats a legislative objective, and
we reject the extreme position that any influence by the courts on
legislative policy-making is illegitimate. The fourth line of criticism is
that the idea of dialogue is flawed because it can, and has, been used to
support both the upholding of laws and the striking down of laws. We
agree that ideas of dialogue have been used by the Supreme Court with
mixed results, but we question whether this is because our idea of
dialogue is flawed or because the Supreme Court is struggling with how
it should decide second look cases. We believe it is the latter, and for
this reason, we have set out some of our preliminary thoughts on how
the Court should decide such cases.
Finally, we have, provided an update of the numbers since
"Charter Dialogue" was published. Although there has been a slight
reduction in legislative responses, we have found that most decisions
since 1997 in which the Court has struck down a law on Chartergrounds
are still followed by a legislative response. For this reason, we return to
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our conclusion that, since the last word can nearly always be (and
usually is) that of the legislature, the anti-majoritarian objection to
judicial review is not particularly strong. And, although we do not carry
a torch for the word "dialogue" as the only possible description for the
phenomenon of legislative responses to judicial decisions under the
Charter, we say that our critics should deal with the significance of the
phenomenon, rather than making "much ado about metaphors."
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APPENDIX I: LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES'79
Benner v. Canada (Secretary of State), [1997] 1 S.C.R 358
Law Affected: Differential treatment of children born abroad
before 15 February 1977 to a Canadian father and a non-Canadian
mother, as compared to children born abroad before 15 February 1977
to a Canadian mother and a non-Canadian father: Citizenship Act,
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-29, sections 3(1)(e), 5(2)(b), 22; Citizenship
Regulation, C.R.C., c. 400, section 20.
Charter Section Breached: section 15(1).
Legislative Sequel: The impugned section would have been
replaced by-section 5(1)(b) of Bill C-18, which died on the order paper
on 12 November 2003: Bill C-18, An Act respecting Canadian
citizenship, 2nd Sess., 37th Parl. 2002. No other response to date.
Libman v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 569
Law Affected: The spending limits imposed by Quebec's
referendum legislation upon groups other than the two national
committees: Referendum Act, R.S.Q., c. C-64.1, sections 402, 403, 404,
406(3), 413, 414, 416, 417 of Appendix 2.
CharterSection Breached: sections 2(b) and (d).
Legislative Sequel: The most "problematic" section, section 404,
was amended to allow for a higher spending limit, and the remaining
sections were re-enacted: An Act to Amend the Election Act, The
Referendum Act and Other Legislative Provisions, S.Q. 1998, c. 52.
Reference re Remuneration of Judges, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3
CharterSection Breached: section 11(d).
Law Affected in Alberta: The Alberta law that permitted judges'
salaries to be reduced without the involvement of an independent
commission which recommends changes to judicial remuneration:
Provincial Court Judges Act, S.A. 1981, c. P-20.1, sections 13(1)(a),
13(1)(b), 17(1); Payment to Provincial Judges Amendment Regulation,
Alta. Reg. 116/94.
"The research in this appendix is current as of 6 March 2006.
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Legislative Sequel in Alberta: Alberta enacted legislation
establishing an independent commission to assist in the determination
of judicial compensation for provincial judges: Justice Statutes
Amendment Act, 1998, S.A. 1998, c. 18, sections 2, 4.
Law Affected in Manitoba: The Manitoba law which permitted
judges' salaries to be reduced without the involvement of an
independent commission which recommends changes to judicial
remuneration: Public Sector Reduced Work Week and Compensation
Management Act, S.M. 1993, c. 21, sections 4, 9(1) ("Public Sector
Act").
Legislative Sequel in Manitoba: The Public Sector Act was no
longer in force by the time the Court heard the reference. However, the
Court retroactively invalidated the offending portions of the Act. The
Public Sector Act was repealed entirely in 2000: The Statute Law
Amendment Act, 2000, S.M. 2000, c. 35, section 21.
Law Affected in Prince Edward Island: The P.E.I. law that
permitted judges' salaries to be reduced without the involvement of an
independent commission which recommends changes to judicial
remuneration: Provincial Court Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. P-25, section
3(3), as am. by Public Sector Pay Reduction Act, S.P.E.I. 1994, c. 51,
section 10.
Legislative Sequel in Prince Edward Island: P.E.I. enacted
detailed legislation establishing a commission to assist in the
determination of judicial compensation: An Act to Amend the
Provincial Court Act, S.P.E.I. 1997, c. 68.
Thomson Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1998] 1
S.C.R. 877
Law Affected: The prohibition on publication, dissemination, or
broadcast of opinion polls in the last three days of an election campaign:
Canada Elections Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. E-2, sections 213(1), 255, 256,
322.1.
Charter Section Breached: section 2(b).
Legislative Sequel: The old Canada Elections Act was repealed
and replaced with the Canada Elections Act, S.C. 2000, c. 9. Section 328
of the new Act prohibits the publication of surveys related to the
election only on election days.
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Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493
Law Affected: Failure to include "sexual orientation" as a
prohibited ground of discrimination in the Alberta human rights
legislation: Individual's Rights Protection Act, R.S.A. 1980, c. 1-2,
preamble and sections 2(1), 3, 4, 7(1), 8(1), 10, 16(1).
Charter Section Breached: section 15(1); "sexual orientation"
was read in by the Court as a prohibited ground of discrimination.
Legislative Sequel: None to date.
Corbiere v. Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs), [1999] 2
S.C.R. 203
Law Affected: Restriction of voting rights for band elections to
band members "ordinarily resident on the reserve": Indian Act, R.S.C.
1985, c. 1-5, section 77(1).
Charter Section Breached: section 15(1). The Court declared
the phrase "and is ordinarily resident on the reserve" invalid, but
suspended the declaration for eighteen months.
Legislative Sequel: The regulations were amended to provide
that an elector "means a person who is qualified under section 77 of the
Act to vote in that election": Regulations Amending the Indian Band
Election Regulations, S.O.R. 2000-391; and Regulations Amending the
Indian Referendum Regulations, S.O.R. 2000-392. However, the
definition in section 77(1) has not been amended, though it would have
been repealed and replaced by Bill C-61, An Act respecting leadership
selection, administration and accountability of Indian bands, and to
make related amendments to other Acts, 1st Sess., 37th Parl., 2002,
which died on the order paper on 16 September 2002, and was
reintroduced as Bill C-7, An Act respecting leadership selection,
administration and accountability of Indian bands, and to make related
amendments to otherActs, 2nd Sess., 37th Parl., 2002, which died on the
order paper on 12 November 2003.
M v. H., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3
Law Affected: The exclusion of same-sex couples from the
definition of "spouse" for the purposes of spousal support payments:
FamilyLawAct, R.S.O. 1990, c. F-3, section 29 ("FLA").
Charter Section Breached: section 15(1). The declaration of
invalidity was suspended for six months.
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Legislative Sequel: Section 29 of the FLA was amended to
include a separate category of "same-sex partner," which was defined as
either of two persons of the same sex who have cohabitated either
continuously for a period of not less than three years, or in a
relationship of some permanence, if they are the natural or adoptive
parents of a child: Amendments because of the Supreme Court of
Canada Decision in M v. H. Act, S.O. 1999, c. 9, section 25(2). These
amendments were repealed in 2005, when the Ontario legislature
repealed the category of "same-sex partner" and amended the definition
of "spouse" in section 29(a) by substituting "two persons" for "a man
and woman," thereby abolishing any distinction between opposite-sex
and same-sex spouses: Spousal Relationships Statute Law Amendment
Act, S.O. 2005, c. 5.
United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Local 1518
v. KMart Canada Ltd., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 1083
Law Affected: The definition of "picketing": British Columbia
Labour Relations Code, S.B.C. 1992, c. 82, section 1(1).
Charter Section Breached: section 2(b). The declaration of
invalidity was suspended for six months.
Legislative Sequel: None. The British Columbia Labour
Relations Board has, absent a statutory definition of picketing,
determined that picketing issues are to be determined both in light of
the Code and the Charter. see Overwaitea Food Group, a Division of
Great Pacific Industries Inc. and United Food and Commercial Workers
International Union, Local 1518 (2003), BCLRB No. B361/2003 (Leave
for Reconsideration of BCLRB No. B322/2002).
Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2001] 3 S.C.R. 1016
Law Affected: The exclusion of agricultural workers from the
labour relations regime: Labour Relations Act, 1995, S.O. 1995, c. 1,
Sched. A, section 3(b); and Labour Relations and Employment Statute
Law Amendment Act, 1995, S.O. 1995, c. 1
Charter Section Breached: section 2(d). The declarations of
invalidity were suspended for eighteen months.
Legislative Sequel: Legislation was enacted providing certain
rights to agricultural employees, including the right to form or join an
employees' association; the right to participate in the lawful activities of
an employees' association; the right to assemble; the right to make
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representations to their employers, through an employees' association,
respecting the terms and conditions of their employment; and the right
to protection against interference, coercion, and discrimination in the
exercise of their rights: Agricultural Employees Protection Act, 2002,
S.O. 2002, c. 16.
R. v. Ruzic, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 687
Law Affected: The immediacy and presence requirements of the
defence of duress: Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, section 17.
Charter Section Breached: section 7.
Legislative Sequel: None to date.
Mackin v. New Brunswick (Minister of Finance, Rice v. New
Brunswick, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 405
Law Affected: The abolition by the legislature of the position of
supernumerary judge of the Provincial Court of New Brunswick: Act .to
Amend the Provincial Court Act, S.N.B. 1995, c. 6.
Charter Section Breached: section 11(d).
Legislative Sequel: New Brunswick amended its Provincial
Court Act to recreate the position of supernumerary judge, although
under slightly different conditions. In addition, a separate panel of
retired judges was also created: Act to Amend the Provincial Court Act,
S.N.B. 2003, c. 18.
R. v. Hall, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 309
Law Affected: The provision which allowed bail to be denied
"on any other just cause being shown": Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c.
C-46, section 515(10)(c).
Charter Section Breached: section 11(e).
Legislative Sequel: None to date.
Sauvd v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519
Law Affected: The provision that prohibited all prison inmates
serving sentences of more than two years from voting in federal
elections: Canada Elections Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-2, section 51(e).
CharterSection Breached: section 3.
Legislative Sequel: None to date.
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Lavalde, Rackel & Heintz v. Canada (Attorney General, White,
Ottenheimer & Baker v. Canada (Attorney General, R. v. Fink, [2002]
3 S.C.R. 209
Law Affected: Procedures regarding seizure of documents from
the office of a lawyer: Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, section
488.1.
CharterSection Breached: section 8.
Legislative Sequel: None to date.
R. v. Guignard, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 472
Law Affected: Prohibition on the erection of advertising signs
outside an industrial zone: City of Saint-Hyacinthe, By-law No. 1200,
section 14.1.5(p).
Charter Section Breached: section 2(b). The declaration of
invalidity was suspended for six months.
Legislative Sequel: The City of Saint-Hyacinthe enacted a new
bylaw, abolishing the impugned provision and providing for certain
other regulations relating to the erection of advertising signs outside an
industrial zone: City of Saint-Hyacinthe, By-law No. 1200-364.
Ruby v. Canada (Solicitor General), [2002] 4 S.C.R. 3
Law Affected: The provision for in camera and ex parte
proceedings where the government denied an applicant's request for
access to personal information on the grounds of national security or the
maintenance of foreign confidences: Privacy Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-21,
sections 51(2)(a), 51(3).
Charter Section Breached: section 2(b). The provision in section
51(2)(a) requiring in camera proceedings was read down to apply only
to situations where the head of the government department referred to
in section 51(3) elected to make his or her representations exparte.
Legislative Sequel: None to date.
Figueroa v. Canada (Attorney General), [2003] 1 S.C.R. 912
Law Affected: Provisions establishing a threshold of fifty
candidates in order for a party to obtain and keep registered party
status: Canada Elections Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-2, sections 24(3), 24(3),
28(7).
Charter Section Breached: section 3. The declaration of
invalidity was suspended for twelve months.
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Legislative Sequel: The fifty-candidate threshold requirement
has been replaced by a series of new registration requirements,
including that the party endorse and support at least one candidate, that
it provide signed declarations of support from at least 250 members, and
that it have no fewer than four party officers. The definition of "political
party" has been changed to a purpose-based definition and requires that
parties satisfy the definition both at registration and on an ongoing basis
in order to be "political parties" within the meaning of the Act: An Act
to amend the Canada Elections Act and the Income Tax Act, S.C. 2004,
c. 24.
Trociuk v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2003] 1 S.C.R. 835
Law Affected: Provision giving biological mothers the sole
discretion to include or to exclude information relating to biological
fathers when registering the birth of a child and to choose the child's last
name: Vital Statistics Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 479, sections 3(1)(b),
3(6)(b).
Charter Section Breached: section 15(1). The declaration of
invalidity was suspended for twelve months.
Legislative Sequel: New legislation was enacted which provides
that a father's particulars must be included on his child's registration of
birth if an application is accompanied by a paternity order: Health
Planning Statistics Amendment Act, S.B.C. 2002, c. 15. In addition, the
Vital Statistics Act was also amended to allow a court to make an order
declaring a child's parentage or changing a child's name: Vital Statistics
Amendment Act, 2004, S.B.C. 2004, c. 55.
Nova Scotia (Workers' Compensation Board) v. Martin, Nova Scotia
(Workers' Compensation Board) v. Laseur, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 504
Law Affected: Exclusion of chronic pain from the workers'
compensation regime, and provision of four-week functional restoration
program beyond which no further benefits were available: Workers'
Compensation Act, S.N.S. 1994-95, c. 10, section 10B; Functional
Restoration (Multi-Faceted Pain Services) Program Regulations, N.S.
Reg. 57/96.
Charter Section Breached: section 15(1). The declaration of
invalidity was suspended for six months.
Legislative Sequel: Clause 4 of Bill 20, An Act to Amend the
Workers' Compensation Act and, the Occupational Health and Safety
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Act, 1st Sess., 59th Leg., repeals the impugned section of the Workers'
Compensation Act and makes chronic pain a personal injury that must
be individually assessed. Bill 20 received second reading on 24 October
2003 and was being examined by the Law Amendments Committee as
recently as 23 January 2004, but has not yet progressed any further
toward enactment.
R. v. Demers, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 489
Law Affected: The power to detain accused persons found
permanently unfit to stand trial: Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46,
sections 672.33, 672.54, 672.81(1).
Charter Section Breached: section 7.
Legislative Sequel: Parliament has enacted new provisions
providing for a means of obtaining a stay of proceedings against accused
persons found permanently unfit to stand trial: An Act to amend the
Criminal Code (mental disorder) and to make consequential
amendments to otherActs, S.C. 2005, c. 22, s. 33, section 672.851.
Solski (Tutor of) v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] 1 S.C.R. 201
Law Affected: The requirement, as a condition of eligibility for
English public schools in Qu6bec, that a child have completed the
"major part" of his or her previous education in English: Charter of the
French language, R.S.Q. c. C-11, section 73(2).
Charter Section Breached: section 23(2).
Legislative Sequel: None to date.
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APPENDIX II: "SECOND LOOK" CASES
Baron v. Canada, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 416
Law Affected:. The procedure for obtaining search warrants
which appeared to give judges no discretion in deciding whether to grant
or deny them: Income Tax Act, S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 63, s. 231.3, as am.
1986, c. 6, s. 121. The 1986 amendments followed MNR. v. Kruger,
[1984] 2 F.C. 535, (C.A.) and Reference Re Print Three Inc. (1985), 51
O.R. (2d) 321 (C.A.).
CharterSection Breached: section 8.
Legislative Sequel: The impugned provision was amended to
stipulate that judges "may," rather than "shall," grant a search warrant:
An Act to Amend the Income TaxAct. S.C. 1994, c. 21, s. 107.
R. v. Pontes, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 44
Law Affected: A 5-4 majority of the Court held that despite the
1986 repeal of the Motor Vehicle Act subsection impugned in
Reference Re Section 94(2) of the B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2
S.C.R. 486, driving with a suspended licence remained an absolute
liability offence. However, section 4.1 of the Offence Act could be used
by the Court to read down a penalty of imprisonment for that offence.
Without the penalty of imprisonment, section 7 of the Charter was not
breached.
R. v. Mills, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668
Law Affected: Bill C-46 (S.C. 1997, c. 30) was enacted to amend
the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, following the Court's decision
in R. v. O'Connor, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411. In Mills, the Court held that Bill
C-46 was a constitutional response to the problem of production of
records of complainants or witnesses in sexual assault proceedings. The
Court held that sections 7 and 11(d) of the Charter were not breached
despite the fact that the Bill differed from the regime that the majority
of the Court approved in O'Connor.
R. v. Darrach, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 443
Law Affected: Parliament enacted the current section 276 of the
Criminal Code in Bill C-49 in 1992 (now S.C. 1992, c. 38) following the
Court's decision in R. v. Seaboyer, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577. The Court in
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Darrach found that the new section 276 essentially codified the decision
in Seaboyer and provided a mechanism for the trial judge to determine
the admissibility of evidence of prior sexual activity. The Court found
that section 276 did not violate sections 7, 11(c), and 11(d) of the
Charter.
R. v. Hall, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 309
Law Affected: The provision which allowed bail to be denied
"on any other just cause being shown": Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c.
C-46, section 515(10)(c). Section 515(10)(c) was enacted after its
predecessor was struck down in R. v. Morales, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 711. In
Morales, the Court held that the predecessor section, which allowed bail
to be denied where it was in the public interest to do so, was
impermissibly vague, imprecise, and "allowed a standardless sweep" that
would permit "a court to order imprisonment wherever it sees fit."
Section 515(10)(c) allowed bail to be denied "on any other just cause
being shown." This portion of paragraph 515(10)(c) was struck down but
the four specific factors enumerated in that paragraph were upheld. The
Court also struck the words "without limiting the generality of the
foregoing."
Charter Section Breached: section 11(e).
Legislative Sequel: None to date.
Sauvd v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519
Law Affected: The provision that prohibited all prison inmates
serving sentences of more than two years from voting in federal
elections: Canada Elections Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-2, section 51(e). In
the predecessor to this decision, Sauv& v. Canada (Attorney General)
[1993] 2 S.C.R. 438 ("Sauvd No. 1"), Sauv6 challenged the predecessor
to section 51(e), which prohibited all prison inmates from voting in
federal elections. Parliament responded by replacing the old section
with a new section 51(e). The new section 51(e), which was continued in
substantially the same form in section 4(c) of the Canada Elections Act
S.C. 2000, c. 9, limited the prohibition on voting to prison inmates
serving sentences of more than two years. In this case (Sauv6 No. 2), the
Court struck down the new section 51(e), which means that all prison
inmates can now vote.
Charter Section Breached: section 3.
Legislative Sequel: None to date.
[VOL. 45, NO. I
Charter Dialogue Revisited
R. v. Demers, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 489
Law Affected: The power to detain accused persons found
permanently unfit to stand trial: Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46,
sections 672.33, 672.54, 672.81(1).
Charter Section Breached: section 7.
Legislative Sequel: Parliament has enacted new provisions
providing. for a means of obtaining a stay of proceedings against
permanently unfit accused: An Act to amend the Criminal Code
(mental disorder) and to make consequential amendments to other
Acts, S.C. 2005, c. 22, s. 33, section 672.851.
Penetanguishene Mental Health Centre v. Ontario (Attorney General),
[2004] 1 S.C.R. 498 and Pinet v. St. Thomas Psychiatric Hospital, [2004]
1 S.C.R. 528
Law Affected: The Court was asked to consider whether the
"least onerous and least restrictive" requirement in section 672.54 of the
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 applies only to the bare choice
among the three potential dispositions of the case (absolute discharge,
conditional discharge, or continued detention), or whether this
requirement applies also to the particular conditions forming part of
that disposition. This provision was enacted in response to the Court's
decision in Winko v. British Columbia (Forensic Psychiatric Institute),
[1999] 2 S.C.R. 625. The Court held that the new provision did not
violate section 7 of the Charter.
Harper v. Canada (Attorney General), [2004] 1 S.C.R. 827
Law Affected: Certain provisions regarding third-party
advertising in the Canada Elections Act, enacted in response to Libman
v. Ouebec (Attorney General), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 569: Canada Elections
Act, S.C. 2000, c. 9, sections 323(1), 323(3), 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355,
356, 357, 359, 360, 362. The majority of the Court held that the new
provisions violated section 2(b) but were saved by section 1.
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